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Some constitutional questions implicate multiple, overlapping provisions of the
Constitution’s text. In resolving these questions, the Supreme Court typically addresses
each of the relevant clauses in separate and sequential fashion, taking care not to let
its analysis of one clause affect its analysis of any other. But every so often the Court
takes a different approach, looking to the clauses in combination rather than in isolation.
The Court has sometimes suggested, for instance, that two or more rights-based
provisions might require the invalidation of government action, even where no single
provision would do so on its own. The Court has also suggested that a federal law might
fall too far outside the scope of Article I and too far within the scope of a rights-based
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provision to withstand constitutional attack. And the Court has very occasionally
suggested that a congressional enactment might qualify as a necessary and proper
means of enforcing multiple enumerated powers at once. In all of these cases, the
Court has embraced (or at least tinkered with) forms of what I call “combination
analysis”—justifying judicial outcomes by reference to multiple clauses acting together,
as opposed to individual clauses acting alone.
This Article presents a systematic examination of combination analysis in U.S.
constitutional law. In so doing, it seeks to make four contributions to the burgeoning
scholarly literature on the subject. First, the Article collects and taxonomizes existing
examples of combination analysis in U.S. Supreme Court doctrine, demonstrating that
combination arguments have enjoyed a wider range of application than has thus far been
supposed. Second, the Article examines the conceptual structure of combination analysis,
revealing some underappreciated functional similarities between combination-based
constitutional reasoning and other more commonly accepted features of public law
adjudication (including, for instance, arguments based on constitutional structure
and arguments based on the constitutional avoidance canon). Third, the Article sorts
through the practical pros and cons of combination analysis, shedding light on the
questions of whether and (if so) when courts should advance combination arguments
in the course of resolving a particular case. Finally, the Article offers some preliminary
guidance regarding the implementation of combination analysis, identifying in particular
four different types of “combination errors” that courts should strive to avoid. What
emerges from the discussion is the conclusion that combination analysis represents a
real and conceptually valid method of constitutional reasoning, which, at least under
some circumstances, stands to benefit the development of constitutional law.
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INTRODUCTION
Thumb through the pages of a constitutional law casebook, and you will
likely notice an organizational structure that makes heavy use of the document’s
clauses. One section of the book will cover the Equal Protection Clause; another
will cover the Due Process Clause; another the Commerce Clause; another
the Taxing Clause; and so on. This organizational scheme reflects an important
feature of the Supreme Court’s doctrinal output. To a substantial (though not
universal) degree, discrete and separate provisions of the Constitution’s text
have spawned discrete and separate bodies of constitutional law. Constitutional
adjudication thus involves the tasks of identifying the constitutional provision
most relevant to the case, looking up the clause-specific doctrinal rules associated
with that provision, and then resolving the case in accordance with those rules.
In this way do abstract questions of constitutional validity often reduce down
to particularized assessments of clausal consistency.
That pattern remains in place even when government action implicates
multiple, separate clauses at the same time. To decide these multiple clause
cases, courts frequently apply the law of each provision in sequential and
independent fashion, taking care not to intermingle the different clause-specific
doctrines being applied. For instance, when the Supreme Court confronted
the Violence Against Women Act, it first considered the law’s validity as an
exercise of the commerce power and then considered its validity as an exercise
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s enforcement power, taking care not to let its
analysis of the Commerce Clause question influence its analysis of the
Enforcement Clause question (and vice versa).1 When the Court struck down
a Texas antisodomy law as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
1

See generally United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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Justices divided on whether to rest the decision on the Due Process Clause or
on the Equal Protection Clause, with no Justice invoking the combined
authority of the two clauses together.2 Other cases reflect a similar approach.3
When litigants assert claims arising under multiple areas of constitutional
doctrine, the strengths or weaknesses of one clause-specific claim typically
have no official bearing on the strengths or weaknesses of another.4
But the Court has not always toed this line. In several cases—some recent,
some old—it has experimented with an alternative approach, one that traverses
the boundary lines that mark the clauses’ separate doctrinal territories. The
Court, that is, has sometimes combined constitutional clauses, deriving an overall
conclusion of constitutional validity (or invalidity) from the joint decisional
force of two or more constitutional provisions. Most familiarly, the Court has
indicated that multiple rights-based provisions of the Constitution might
sometimes require the invalidation of government action that would be permitted
if each provision were considered in isolation.5 Somewhat less familiarly, the
Court has held that congressional action can fall too far outside the scope of
Article I and too far within the scope of a rights-based guarantee to withstand
constitutional scrutiny.6 And very occasionally, the Court has suggested that a
congressional statute—though not expressly authorized by any single enumerated
power—derives its validity from multiple enumerated powers acting in the
aggregate.7 In all of these instances, the Court has employed a form of
“combination analysis,” justifying constitutional outcomes by reference to
collections of constitutional clauses, rather than one such clause in particular.
Combination analysis is not unknown to scholars of constitutional law.
But most of the existing commentary on the subject takes the form of brief
2 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Rather than
relying on the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as the
Court does, I base my conclusion on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.”).
3 See, e.g., McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1720 (2013) (“Because Virginia’s citizens-only FOIA
provision neither abridges any of petitioners’ fundamental privileges and immunities nor impermissibly
regulates commerce, petitioners’ constitutional claims fail.”); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
525, 532 (2001) (asking first whether Massachusetts’ smoking regulations were statutorily preempted,
and second whether the nonpreempted portions of the statute were nonetheless invalid restrictions
of commercial speech under the First Amendment); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473 (1980)
(opinion of Burger, C.J.) (asking first whether a federal race-based set-aside program fell “within
the power of Congress” under the General Welfare Clause, and second whether the program “violate[s]
the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment”), overruled in part
by Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
4 Cf. Michael H. Shapiro, Argument Selection in Constitutional Law: Choosing and Reconstructing
Conceptual Systems, 18 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 209, 310-11 (2009) (suggesting that courts often
choose only one among many potential legal grounds for deciding a case, while noting that courts
“sometimes cumulate arguments for added persuasive effect”).
5 See infra Section II.A.
6 See infra Section II.B.
7 See infra Section II.C.
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and targeted discussions of particular examples, offering little in the way of
thorough and detailed investigations of the method in its myriad forms.8 The
bulk of the existing commentary, in fact, concerns one and the same example:
The Supreme Court’s landmark Free Exercise decision in Employment Division
v. Smith.9 There, in denying requests for free exercise relief, the Court suggested
that the Free Exercise Clause might elsewhere operate “in conjunction with
other constitutional protections” to impose a stronger set of limits than what
any single clause would impose on its own.10 That suggestion, along with several
other aspects of the Smith decision, provoked numerous—and mostly negative—
responses, with judges and scholars dismissing Smith’s hybrid-rights rule as
“unintelligible,”11 “conceptually flawed,”12 and (the ultimate barb) “completely
illogical.”13 And on one level, these commentators had a point: various aspects
8 One notable exception is Ariel Porat & Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2,
48-55 (2012), whose relevance to the project I discuss further infra note 16. In addition, some constitutional
scholars have explored different ways of thinking about cases involving multiple rights-related claims,
and in the course of doing so, have considered various means by which those claims might be
considered in a cumulative or aggregated manner. See David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A
Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 661-64 (1994) [hereinafter Faigman,
Madisonian Balancing] (proposing an idealized model of rights-based balancing, under which the
strength of government interests is weighed against the sum total of the liberty interests implicated
by government action); David L. Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality Transactionally, 45 HASTINGS
L.J. 753, 772-78 (1994) [hereinafter Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality] (modifying the balancing
model, while continuing to call for the aggregation of rights on the “liberty interest” side of the
equation); Stephen Kanter, The Griswold Diagrams: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Rights,
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 624-25 (2006) (considering and developing various analytical frameworks
“for the courts to use in looking for and finding fundamental individual rights that are not textually
explicit”); Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights 2 (Univ. of Va. Sch.
of Law, Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series 2015-42, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2642640 [https://perma.cc/K5JB-UC62] (highlighting the “categorically distinct ways in which
cumulative constitutional rights cases can arise” and the various means by which “these different
forms affect constitutional scrutiny”). That said, and to the best of my knowledge, this Article is the
first to develop a systematic framework for thinking about and evaluating combination analysis as a
general method of constitutional adjudication, whose application extends not only to cases involving
multiple rights-related claims, but also to cases involving rights-related claims along with power-related
claims, and to cases involving multiple power-related claims.
9 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
10 Id. at 881.
11 Alan E. Brownstein, Constitutional Questions About Vouchers, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
119, 120 (2000).
12 Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: Toward a Unified Theory of First
Amendment Exemptions from Neutral Laws of General Applicability, 66 MO. L. REV. 9, 52 (2001).
13 Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., Coll. of Veterinary Med., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th
Cir. 1993); accord id. (“We do not see how a state regulation would violate the Free Exercise Clause
if it implicates other constitutional rights but would not violate the Free Exercise Clause if it did not
implicate other constitutional rights.”); Peter M. Stein, Note, Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing
Commission: Does the Right to Exclude, Combined with Religious Freedom, Present a “Hybrid Situation”
Under Employment Division v. Smith?, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 174 (1995) (“If . . . the Free Exercise
Clause only has meaning when combined with another constitutional interest, the Clause functions
in a manner similar to Hamburger Helper.”); see also Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144 (2d
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of Smith’s hybrid-rights reasoning raised vexing questions not adequately dealt
with by the Court in Smith itself.14 But insofar as the post-Smith commentary
purported to address the topic of combination analysis more generally, its
Smith-oriented focus limited its ability to shed full light on the subject as a whole.
This Article thus attempts to provide a broader and more systematic
examination of combination analysis in constitutional law—one that includes,
but also looks beyond, Smith’s well-known “hybrid rights” rule. In doing so,
the Article seeks to enrich existing understandings of the phenomenon in at
least four ways. First, it demonstrates as a doctrinal matter that combination
analysis enjoys a stronger foothold in Supreme Court case law than has
generally been suggested. This is true not only in the direct sense that the
Court and its Justices have relied on combination-based reasoning in several
constitutional cases, but also in the indirect sense that combination-based
reasoning shares important analytical similarities with other types of arguments
that courts and commentators routinely employ—specifically, arguments based
on the canon of constitutional avoidance and arguments based on so-called

Cir. 2003) (“We . . . can think of no good reason for the standard of review to vary simply with the
number of constitutional rights that the plaintiff asserts have been violated.”); Hicks ex rel. Hicks v.
Halifax Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 93 F. Supp. 2d 649, 661 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (characterizing the hybrid-rights
exception as “seemingly impenetrable”); Eric A. DeGroff, State Regulation of Nonpublic Schools: Does the Tie
Still Bind?, 2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 363, 378 n.69 (suggesting that the Court in Smith was “engaging
in a form of new math, suggesting that 0 + 0 = 1”); James D. Gordon III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop,
79 CALIF. L. REV. 91, 96, 98 n.49 (1991) (attributing to Smith a “Hamburger Helper” theory of the law).
Not everyone has been so dismissive of Smith’s foray into combination analysis. Professor
Stephen Kanter in particular has pointed out that Smith shares much in common with several other
rights-related cases, which “also rely on composite or hybrid rights as the basis for ruling in favor of
the individual.” Kanter, supra note 8, at 638; see also Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality, supra note
8, at 775 (discussing Smith in similar terms). And other scholars have already pushed back against
the specific charge that the hybrid rights exception commits a basic error of mathematical logic. See,
e.g., Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi, and the General
Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850, 858 (2001) (“Although it is certainly true that
zero plus zero does not equal one, it is equally true that the sum of a number of fractions—one-half
plus one-half, for example—may equal one.”); Porat & Posner, supra note 8, at 48-49.
14 The most powerful criticisms of Smith’s hybrid-rights rule focused on its shaky precedential
foundations. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1121 (1990) (“One suspects that the notion of ‘hybrid’ claims was created for the
sole purpose of distinguishing Yoder in this case.”). Another line of criticisms targeted the Court’s
strange conclusion that Smith itself did not represent just such a “hybrid” case—the claimants in
Smith, after all, had participated in a public and expressive religious ritual, thus seemingly bringing
into play both free exercise and free association protections in addition to the free exercise
protections on which they relied. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (noting that “free speech and associational rights
are certainly implicated in the peyote ritual”); McConnell, supra note 14, at 1122 (suggesting that
“Smith itself ” could qualify as a “‘hybrid’ case”). A third set of criticisms suggested that Smith’s
“hybrid rights” language posited an exception that would swallow the rule, given the likelihood that
most free exercise claims would involve conduct that simultaneously implicated other constitutional
protections. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring).
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structural principles of constitutional law. Thus, an initial aim of the ensuing
discussion is to collect and taxonomize existing examples of combination
analysis, while also situating these examples within the broader universe of
arguments that find frequent expression in operative constitutional doctrine.
Second, this Article attempts to demonstrate that the conceptual validity of
combination analysis rests on a small and plausible set of interpretive premises.
In a nutshell, the underlying claim is this: for combination analysis to make
logical sense, we need only accept the notion that government action might
qualify as “partially,” “somewhat,” or “barely” consistent with the dictates of a
particular constitutional clause. By acknowledging this possibility—and rejecting
the view that government action will always comply either fully or not at all
with a clause’s commands—we can easily arrive at the conclusion that collections
of constitutional clauses might support outcomes that no single clause could
support on its own. Put another way, if one provision “partially” prohibits (or
authorizes) government action, and another provision does the same, then we
cannot characterize as “unintelligible” or “completely illogical”15 the conclusion
that the two provisions might together prohibit (or authorize) that action in full.
Third, this Article attempts to shed light on the normative question of
whether combination analysis is desirable. To say that combination analysis is
doctrinally existent and logically valid is not to say that combination analysis
should always be used. And in fact, as this Article suggests, the question of
whether a court should engage in combination analysis requires a careful,
pragmatic assessment of several variables. In one sense, as Professors Ariel
Porat and Eric Posner have suggested, this question implicates the “familiar
rules/standards tradeoff,” pitting the pro-combination values of nuance and
context sensitivity against the anti-combination values of simplicity, predictability,
and ease of administration.16 But the normative evaluation of combination
analysis tees up other issues as well. For example, combination analysis can
sometimes operate to clarify, rather than confuse, the organization of judicial
See Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180; see also supra note 13.
Porat & Posner, supra note 8, at 9, 55-57. Porat and Posner set forth a general framework for
examining the use of “aggregation techniques” across a wide range of legal contexts. Their work is
impressive in scope, encompassing everything from the aggregation of factual elements in contract
law disputes, id. at 28-30, to the aggregation of person-based elements in mass tort litigation, id. at
26-28, to the aggregation of normative elements in public law disputes (including, but not limited
to, the use of combination arguments in constitutional law), id. at 46-53, to many other variations
on the theme, id. at 26-57. But because their article surveys such a broad legal landscape from a high
altitude, Porat and Posner understandably do not explore in detail the various ways in which these
values bring themselves to bear on the particular task of adjudicating constitutional cases under
existing doctrine. My analysis aims to complement their broad survey of aggregation writ-large with
an in-depth analysis of what Porat and Posner call “cross-claim normative aggregation” in the particular
field of constitutional law. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). In doing so, I hope to yield insights of interest
to scholars and practitioners of U.S. constitutional law, while also shedding new light on the “aggregation
puzzles” that Posner and Porat have addressed more generally. Id. at 4.
15
16
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doctrine,17 while also according partially binding (as opposed to totally binding)
precedential status to some elements of a judicial holding.18 On the other hand,
combination analysis can give rise to tensions with (if not outright departures
from) the constitutional text,19 and it might also undermine values of judicial
restraint.20 Moreover, the desirability of combination analysis may carry a
distinctively substantive valence, with particular types of combination analysis
being more or less likely to promote certain results-oriented goals.21 My analysis
disaggregates and evaluates these different questions, offering a more complete
accounting of the various costs and benefits that combination analysis brings to
the table. The tentative conclusion is that the cost–benefit calculus is not
sufficiently one-sided as to warrant a categorical, bright-line rule against the
use of combination arguments in all multiple clause cases. Rather, I conclude that
the utility of combination analysis is better evaluated on a basis that proceeds
clause-by-clause and case-by-case.
Finally, this Article offers prescriptive guidance regarding the use of
combination analysis in future constitutional cases. Specifically, it identifies
four types of “combination errors” that courts should endeavor to avoid when
considering the clauses’ combined effects. For example, combination analysis
can give rise to “non-counting errors,” which occur when a court applies the
rule of a previous combination-based holding to a case that does not implicate
all of the clauses underlying the original holding. Combination analysis can
also give rise to “double counting errors,” which occur when a court gives
artificially inflated effect to a clause whose values and commands have already
been incorporated into another clause’s decision rules. Combination errors
might also arise from failures to recognize the negative implications that flow
from affirmative grants of constitutional power, and they might further arise
from a court’s use of combination analysis to render a single constitutional
holding about two “transactionally separate” events. I survey each of these
errors and offer some targeted thoughts on the question of how courts should
avoid them. In so doing, I hope to offer along the way some bigger picture
observations about constitutional decisionmaking.
My discussion of these issues comprises five (uncombined) Parts. Part I
offers definitional details. Part II catalogues examples of combination analysis
in Supreme Court case law, aiming to show that it has arisen with surprising
frequency across different doctrinal domains. Part III then turns to the
structure of combination analysis, describing and defending its internal logic,

17
18
19
20
21

See infra Section IV.A.
See infra subsection IV.A.2.
See infra subsection IV.B.1.
See infra subsection IV.B.2.
See infra Section IV.C.
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before relating the practice to two widely accepted techniques of constitutional
decisionmaking. Part IV addresses the normative question of whether and to
what extent courts should combine the clauses in constitutional cases. Finally,
Part V concludes the analysis by highlighting the four above-mentioned errors
and flagging some unresolved issues for further investigation.
Above all else, however, the Article aims to show that combination analysis
is a phenomenon worthy of further investigation. Even if one concludes that
courts should refrain from combining constitutional clauses under any and all
circumstances, the journey to that conclusion remains a journey worth taking.
Simply put, I aim to demonstrate that a careful examination of combination
analysis in constitutional law—one that considers its existing doctrinal presence,
its conceptual structure, and its practical upsides and downsides—furnishes
much in the way of useful and interesting insights about constitutional
adjudication more generally. Even if infrequently employed, combination
analysis offers an illuminating window into the ever-present and always-daunting
challenge of translating the barebones constitutional text into fair and effective
rules of constitutional law.
I. WHAT IS COMBINATION ANALYSIS?
Combination arguments share four key features. First, combination
arguments invoke multiple provisions of the constitutional text. A combination
argument does not emerge from the straightforward determination that a
discriminatory statute violates the Equal Protection Clause, from the
straightforward determination that a government censorship practice violates the
First Amendment right to free expression, or from any other determination that
government action either does or does not comport with the dictates of a single
constitutional clause. Rather, combination arguments arise when courts resolve
a constitutional case by reference to two or more provisions seen as having
some independent relevance to a case’s proper outcome.22 Thus, for instance,
if a government censorship practice also happened to operate in a racially
22 This condition may sound simple, but some nagging complexities lurk beneath the surface.
The problem arises from determining whether judicial analysis rests on multiple constitutional
provisions, as opposed to a single such provision. For example, imagine a claim that the First and
Second Amendments together warrant invalidation of a state-law restriction on the three-dimensional
printing of firearm-related materials. See Josh Blackman, The 1st Amendment, 2nd Amendment, and
3D Printed Guns, 81 TENN. L. REV. 479, 505-08 (2014). Technically speaking, the claim would rest
on the single provision of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause—one component of
which incorporates the right to free speech and another component of which incorporates the right
to bear arms. But the claim nonetheless seems combination-like in that it fuses together two
traditionally discrete and differentiated areas of constitutional law, each closely associated with a
separate provision of the constitutional text. Unless otherwise indicated, I will treat arguments of
this sort as generally falling within the domain of my analysis, recognizing the important technical
caveat that they ultimately concern the meaning of one and only one clause.
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discriminatory fashion, a combination argument would arise from the claim that
the practice violates the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause
acting together. But the same case would not implicate combination analysis
if a court simply held that the practice violated one of the two clauses on its own.
The second distinguishing feature of combination arguments concerns the
nondispositive effect of each of the clauses being combined. A combination
argument does not assert that more than one constitutional provision
independently supports a particular judicial outcome; rather, it asserts that
two or more clauses support that same outcome in conjunction with one
another.23 This criterion helps distinguish combination analysis from the
practice of asserting arguments in the alternative. A lower court might
conclude, for instance, that a law violates both the Equal Protection Clause
and also violates the First Amendment. But that is different from concluding
that the law violates the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment
working together. The first argument offers two independent rationales for a
single holding, whereas the second argument offers a single such rationale,
which draws its strength from the doctrines’ combined decisional force.
Third, the constituent clauses of a combination argument relate to one
another in a coordinate, rather than derivative, manner. Combination arguments
do not necessarily arise when one clause incorporates by reference the contents
of another. The Court might, for instance, uphold a congressional statute by
reference to the combined force of the Necessary and Proper Clause and some
other enumerated power of Article I, Section 8,24 just as it might uphold a civil
rights enforcement measure by reference to the combined effect of Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment25 and an individual provision of the Bill of Rights.
But in these cases, multiple clauses acquire relevance only because the text of one
clause functions as a sort of “gateway” into the domain of another clause.
With combination analysis, by contrast, it is the subject matter of a constitutional
issue that implicates—independently and in parallel—multiple constitutional
provisions at the same time. None of the combined provisions, in other words,
carries decisional weight on account of a definitional linkage to another.26
23 The Court does not often invoke two separate clauses as independently sufficient bases for a
particular constitutional outcome. But the trend is not entirely uniform. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that “restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications
violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause” and “also deprive[s] the Lovings of
liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause” (emphasis added)).
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
26 That is not to say that “incorporative” arguments cannot operate alongside combination
arguments. In fact, many examples I consider are best viewed as involving both arguments at the
same time. When, for instance, the Court invalidates a state-level practice by reference to the combined
force of two separate provisions of the Bill of Rights, it is actually invoking the combined force of
two different components of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, each of which acquires
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Finally, combination analysis focuses on the decisional force rather than
the linguistic meaning of the clauses being combined. Combination arguments
group clauses together for the purpose of creating reasons for judicial results, not
for the purpose of clarifying matters of semantic uncertainty. In this respect,
combination arguments might be distinguished from in pari materia or intratextual
arguments regarding ambiguous words or phrases in the constitutional text.27
Like combination arguments, these arguments invoke the authority of multiple
constitutional provisions to defend propositions that are less well supported
by any single provision. But the defended propositions are different. An in
pari materia argument articulates a proposition about what a term means (e.g.,
“Term A signifies X rather than Y because Term A appears in other provisions
where reading it to mean Y would make no sense”), whereas a combination
argument articulates a conclusion about how to dispose of a case (e.g., “This
case should come out this way because Clause A and Clause B together provide
a strong reason for that result”). Combination analysis, in other words, looks
to multiple clauses not for the purpose of discovering and drawing inferences
from their shared semantic features, but rather for the purpose of aggregating
the reasons they provide for resolving a case in one way or another.28
II. COMBINATION ANALYSIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
With these definitional criteria on the table, let us now turn to the task
of identifying existing examples of combination analysis in the Supreme
Court’s case law. The examples can be sorted into three overarching categories:
its content by virtue of the Clause’s incorporation of the Bill of Rights. Somewhat more trickily, when
a Court upholds a congressional enactment on the theory that it constitutes a “necessary and proper”
means of effectuating a group of enumerated powers, we might characterize the ruling as grounded
in a single constitutional provision (i.e., the Necessary and Proper Clause), but in a manner that
incorporates the combined force of several indirectly related provisions (i.e., the various enumerated
powers of Article I). For simplicity’s sake, it will often be useful to abstract away incorporative
elements of decisions that also involve combination-based reasoning. But we should not forget that
many arguments combining clauses are simultaneously incorporating the combined clauses’ content
into that of another.
27 See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999).
28 Of course, the distinction between decisional force and linguistic meaning is itself subject
to uncertainty. It is not always easy to determine whether a constitutional dispute concerns the
meaning of a particular textual provision or instead concerns the application of a provision whose
meaning has already been established. This question, however, is not new to this Article—rather, it
is a recurrent feature of constitutional scholarship more generally. For instance, the meaning–application
distinction has recently received attention from adherents to the “New Originalism,” who treat the
task of discerning a clause’s semantic content as different from the task of giving that clause concrete
legal effect. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 453, 468 (2013) (distinguishing between interpretation, which “refer[s] to the activity of
discovering the linguistic meaning or communicative content of the constitutional text,” and
construction, which “refer[s] to the activity of determining the legal effect given to the text”). The
distinction I draw here may be understood as tracking the same underlying idea.
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(1) “right/right” combinations, (2) “right/no-power” combinations, and
(3) “power/power” combinations. Briefly stated, right/right combinations find
a reason to invalidate government action in the combined operation of two or
more rights-related provisions. Right/no-power combinations, meanwhile, find a
reason to invalidate federal action in the combined operation of a rights-related
provision that arguably prohibits the action, and a power-related provision that
arguably authorizes it. Finally, power/power combinations find a reason to validate
congressional action in the combined operation of two or more constitutional
grants of lawmaking authority. This Part works through each of these examples
in turn. It then considers a fourth set of roughly analogous arguments
involving the combination of different decision rules pertaining to a particular
constitutional provision. All of these examples help to demonstrate the presence
of combination-based reasoning within operative constitutional doctrine.
A. Right/Right Combinations
We have already seen a straightforward example of right/right combination
analysis stemming from Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Employment Division
v. Smith.29 In that case, recall, the Court suggested that claims implicating
only the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment should receive less
rigorous constitutional scrutiny than claims implicating both the Free Exercise
Clause and some other rights-based provision.30 Although some courts have
dismissed this suggestion as unhelpful dicta,31 other courts have taken it seriously,
setting forth a special doctrinal framework for cases that raise colorable claims
involving the free exercise right along with a separate rights-based constitutional
guarantee.32 For these courts, in other words, a right/right combination of
clauses sometimes yields a more restrictive set of limits on government action
than what would exist in the combination’s absence.

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 881-82.
See, e.g., Knight v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Appellants’ reliance
on Smith is misplaced, as the language relating to hybrid claims is dicta and not binding on this court.”);
Kissinger v. Bd. of Trs. of the Ohio State Univ., Coll. of Veterinary Med., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993)
(“[U]ntil the Supreme Court holds that legal standards under the Free Exercise Clause vary depending
on whether other constitutional rights are implicated, we will not use a stricter legal standard . . . .”).
32 See, e.g., Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n, 165 F.3d 692, 702-07 (9th Cir. 1999)
(announcing that, in order to receive the benefit of Smith’s hybrid rights language, a “free exercise plaintiff
must make out a ‘colorable claim’ that a companion right has been violated”), rev’d on other grounds,
220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-L, 135 F.3d 694,
700 (10th Cir. 1998) (permitting hybrid rights claims based on “a colorable showing of infringement
of recognized and specific constitutional rights”); Soc’y of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 939 F.2d
1207, 1216 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that Smith specifically recognizes a “religion-plus-speech” hybrid
right); Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659, 671 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (similar).
29
30
31
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The Court arguably deployed similar logic when it recognized in Obergefell v.
Hodges a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.33 Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion cited to the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment as mutually supportive of the case’s result.34 Although the Court was
not altogether clear as to how it envisioned the two clauses to be interacting with
one another, some of its language suggested a combination-based understanding:
Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on
different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet in some instances each
may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other. In any particular
case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more
accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge in
the identification and definition of the right. This interrelation of the two
principles furthers our understanding of what freedom is and must become.35

Shorn of its lofty rhetoric, the passage conveys a relatively simple idea: the
Due Process Clause alone might fail to resolve the question of whether a ban on
same-sex marriage is unconstitutional, but once the Equal Protection Clause is
added to the picture, the question can come out only one way. The two clauses
together support an outcome that might not be sustained by either clause alone.36
Other examples of right/right combination analysis are not difficult to
find. In an important line of cases, the Court has recognized a heightened set
of constitutional restrictions for indigent criminal defendants seeking access
to post-trial proceedings. Even though the Equal Protection Clause generally
permits the use of wealth-based classifications,37 and even though the Due
Process Clause affords states significant leeway in providing for post-trial
relief,38 the Court has reasoned that states may not condition access to post-trial
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015).
Id.
Id. at 2603 (citations omitted).
Professors Abrams and Garrett characterize Obergefell, along with the broader line of
fundamental rights-based equal protection cases, as involving claims of “intersectional rights,” which
arise when the implicated constitutional provisions are understood to “inform and bolster one
another.” Abrams & Garrett, supra note 8, at 4. As they point out,
33
34
35
36

The key to Obergefell and the other marriage cases is the bundling of multiple, substantial
government benefits into a legal status of cultural heft called “marriage,” and then denying
some but not all people from accessing that status. The discrimination claim and the
fundamental rights claim, standing alone, are simply not as strong. However, both
constitutional sources inform a constitutional analysis that is more demanding than a due
process or equal protection analysis conducted separate and apart.
Id. at 23-24 (footnotes omitted).
37 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980) (noting that “poverty, standing alone, is not
a suspect classification”).
38 See McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1894) (holding that the Constitution does not
guarantee a right to appeal from a criminal conviction).
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proceedings on the basis of unduly restrictive wealth-based criteria.39 The
rationale for this line of cases lies in the combined protections of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses; as far back as Griffin v. Illinois, various
Justices have accepted the proposition that the “constitutional guaranties of
due process and equal protection both call for procedures in criminal trials
which allow no invidious discriminations between persons and different groups
of persons.”40 And today the Court continues to recognize the combination-based
provenance of Griffin and its progeny, acknowledging that “[d]ue process and
equal protection principles converge in . . . the analysis in these cases.”41
Griffin and Obergefell both fall within a larger line of Fourteenth Amendment
cases concerning the “fundamental rights” of constitutional claimants. The Court
has struck down, for instance, various ballot access restrictions as running afoul
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, citing to both free association interests
and equality interests as warranting a more robust set of limits on state laws that
burden a candidate’s ability to run.42 It has struck down various restrictions on
familial arrangements as simultaneously implicating both the protections of
substantive due process doctrine and equal protection doctrine.43 And it has
39 See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality opinion) (holding that states that grant
appellate review of criminal proceedings may not do so “in a way that discriminates against some
convicted defendants on account of their poverty”); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996)
(holding that under “the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,”
a state “may not deny [a claimant], because of her poverty, appellate review of the sufficiency of the
evidence on which the trial court found her unfit to remain a parent”).
40 Griffin, 351 U.S. at 17 (emphasis added); see also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-57
(1963) (requiring, on similar grounds, that states provide appointed counsel to indigent defendants
exercising their right to a criminal appeal).
41 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983); see also Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610
(2005) (“Cases on appeal barriers encountered by persons unable to pay their own way, we have
observed, ‘cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis.’ Our decisions in point
reflect ‘both equal protection and due process concerns.’” (quoting M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120)); Ross
v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608-09 (1974) (“The precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas lines of
cases has never been explicitly stated, some support being derived from the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment.”).
42 See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 786 n.7 (1983) (noting that “[i]n this case we
base our conclusions directly on the First and Fourteenth Amendments” and invoking the “‘fundamental
rights’ strand of equal protection analysis”); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) (determining that
state laws violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments because they “place burdens on two different,
although overlapping, kinds of rights—the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of
political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their
votes effectively”); see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (“The rigorousness of our
inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged
regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.”).
43 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-100 (1987) (citing to both equal protection and due
process precedents in concluding that a rule restricting the marital rights of inmates is “constitutionally
infirm”); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 378 (1978) (holding that a state statute preventing individuals
with prior child support obligations from marrying without a court approval order violates the Equal
Protection Clause); see also KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
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reviewed with similar skepticism various state-based attempts to deny welfare
assistance to newly arrived residents, reasoning, for instance, that a D.C.
residency-duration requirement violated the equal protection component of
the Fifth Amendment in part because the law affected “the fundamental right
of interstate movement.”44
Other cases have yielded similar results. In Stanley v. Georgia, the Court
invoked the combined effect of the right to free expression and substantive due
process protections in invalidating the criminal conviction of an individual
charged with possessing obscene material in his home.45 In Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, a plurality of Justices characterized the right of public access
to criminal trials as “assured by the amalgam of the First Amendment guarantees
of speech and press” and perhaps several others.46 In Griswold v. Connecticut,
the Court concluded that a Connecticut anti-contraceptive statute infringed
on a “zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees”—
namely, the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments.47 On multiple
occasions, the Court has suggested that the void-for-vagueness doctrine, though
rooted in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
“demands a greater degree of specificity” when an allegedly vague statute also
implicates the First Amendment right to free expression.48

529 (18th ed. 2013) (noting that “[a]lthough the majority [in Zablocki] ultimately analyzed the case
in terms of the ‘fundamental rights’ strand of equal protection, it was strongly influenced by substantive
due process precedents treating the ‘right to marry’ as ‘fundamental’”).
44 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). After Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999),
most right-to-travel cases rest primarily on the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Yet, as Professor Stephen Kanter has pointed out, the right recognized in Saenz has a
“multi-source, composite character,” with roots in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment right to petition the government for a redress
of grievances, and the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kanter, supra note 8,
at 639-40 (“[T]he strength of the right to travel or migrate is greatly enhanced by its multi-source
composite character, as evinced by the declaration in Saenz that the right may be even more powerful
than a fundamental right protected by strict scrutiny.”).
45 See 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“[I]n the context of this case—a prosecution for mere possession
of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of a person’s own home—that right [to free expression]
takes on added dimension. For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.”).
46 448 U.S. 555, 577 (1980) (plurality opinion). The right to free association has similarly been
recognized as stemming from “the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.”
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 618 (1984) (“The Constitution guarantees freedom of association of this kind as an indispensable
means of preserving other individual liberties.”).
47 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); see also Faigman, Madisonian Balancing, supra note 8, at 662-63
(discussing Griswold in similar terms).
48 See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (“Where a statute’s literal scope, unaided
by a narrowing state court interpretation, is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First
Amendment, the doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in other contexts.”); Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) (“[T]his Court has intimated that stricter standards of permissible
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Bearing some relation to these “First Amendment vagueness” cases is
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.49
Fraser involved a public school’s decision to suspend a student for regaling his
classmates with some not-so-subtle sexual innuendo during a speech at a school
assembly.50 Challenging his suspension, the student raised two constitutional
claims: (1) that the school had violated the First Amendment by punishing him
for engaging in a protected form of speech; and (2) that the school had violated
the Due Process Clause for failing to afford him prior notice of the disciplinary
policy under which he was punished.51 The majority rejected both claims in
clause-specific fashion, holding first that the First Amendment did not prevent
the school from punishing “offensively lewd and indecent speech,”52 and second
that the Due Process Clause did not impose stringent notice requirements on
school administrators.53 For Justice Stevens, however, it was the combination
of the two constitutional protections that vindicated Fraser’s position. Although
the First Amendment permitted school officials to “regulate the content as well
as the style of student speech in carrying out its educational mission,” the Due
Process Clause and the Free Speech Clause still combined to produce the
requirement that “if a student is to be punished for using offensive speech, he
is entitled to fair notice of the scope of the prohibition and the consequences
of its violation.”54
B. Right/No-Power Combinations
A second category of combination analysis merges arguments about powers
with arguments about rights. Specifically, the Court and its individual Justices
have sometimes questioned the constitutionality of a government practice on the
ground that it simultaneously falls too far outside the scope of a power-related
provision and too far within the scope of a rights-related provision. I call these
right/no-power combinations: a claim that a federal law arguably violates an
individual right combines with a claim that the law is arguably not authorized by
an enumerated power to produce an overall conclusion that the law cannot stand.
Justice Breyer, for instance, has relied on right/no-power arguments to
explain his dissenting position in two different cases concerning the validity
statutory vagueness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man
may the less be required to act at his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser.”).
49 478 U.S. 675, 691-96 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50 Id. at 677-79.
51 Id. at 679.
52 Id. at 685.
53 Id. at 686.
54 Id. at 691 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 692 (“The interest in free speech protected
by the First Amendment and the interest in fair procedure protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment combine to require this conclusion.”).
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of federal copyright laws. In both Golan v. Holder55 and Eldred v. Ashcroft,56
Breyer pointed to both the limited grant of power reflected in the Copyright
Clause and the right to free speech protected by the First Amendment as
reasons to limit Congress’s authority to enact expansive copyright legislation.
In Golan, Justice Breyer reasoned that the challengers’ First Amendment
interests were “important enough to require courts to scrutinize with some
care the reasons claimed to justify the Act [under the Copyright Clause].”57
Likewise in Eldred, he argued for “consider[ing] rationality in light of the
expressive values underlying the Copyright Clause, related as it is to the First
Amendment, and given the constitutional importance of correctly drawing
the relevant Clause/Amendment boundary.”58 Both cases, in his view, yielded
the ultimate conclusion that the “Copyright Clause, interpreted in the light
of the First Amendment, does not authorize Congress to enact this statute.”59
Similar combination-based thinking drove the Court’s reasoning in Hampton
v. Mow Sun Wong.60 The Court struck down a U.S. Civil Service Commission
(CSC) policy that denied noncitizens the opportunity to apply for federal job
positions. Though ostensibly grounded in equal protection principles, the
132 S. Ct. 873 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
537 U.S. 186 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
132 S. Ct. at 908 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
537 U.S. at 264 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 243-44 (“[I]n assessing this statute . . . I
would take into account the fact that the Constitution is a single document, that it contains both a
Copyright Clause and a First Amendment, and that the two are related.”).
59 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 912 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 266-67 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“The statute falls outside the scope of legislative power that the Copyright Clause, read
in light of the First Amendment, grants to Congress.”). Justice Harlan relied on somewhat analogous
reasoning in his separate opinion in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), when he suggested
that especially stringent limits on obscenity regulation should apply against the federal government.
Harlan emphasized that “Congress has no substantive power over sexual morality,” and thus may regulate
obscene speech only in a manner that is “incidental to its other powers.” Id. at 504 (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 294-95 (1952)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) (arguing, with respect to criminal libel, that “[t]he inappropriateness of a
single standard for restricting State and Nation is indicated by the disparity between their functions and
duties in relation to those freedoms”). Congress’s reduced “power” over obscenity thus militated in favor
of a more receptive approach to the free speech claims of individuals facing federal obscenity prosecutions.
60 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976). Some commentators have described Mow Sun Wong as reflecting a
fundamental constitutional principle of “structural due process.” See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, The Rehnquist
Court, Structural Due Process, and Semisubstantive Constitutional Review, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1281, 1370
(2002); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 197 (1976); Laurence H.
Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975). This is not surprising, as
structural due process analysis focuses on the extent to which “the processes by which laws are enacted
affect their validity under seemingly substantive constitutional provisions like the First Amendment
and the Equal Protection Clause.” Coenen, supra note 60, at 1281. In that sense, structural due
process analysis might be understood as a special category of combination analysis, which combines
procedure-related clauses with substance-related clauses to impose a heightened set of restrictions on
government action. I raise the possibility only tentatively, however, recognizing that structural due process
analysis may rest on something more (or something other) than clauses acting in combination.
55
56
57
58
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decision also pointed to the absence of presidential or congressional involvement
in the development of the CSC’s alienage restrictions; indeed, the Court
expressly left open the possibility that “an explicit determination by Congress
or the President to exclude all noncitizens from the federal service” might pass
constitutional muster.61 This aspect of the majority’s reasoning led then-Justice
Rehnquist to characterize the decision as “engraft[ing] notions of due process
onto the case law from this Court dealing with the delegation by Congress of
its legislative authority to administrative agencies.”62 Put somewhat differently,
the majority seemed to suggest that whereas alienage restrictions for federal
employment did not violate equal protection principles standing alone, and
whereas the exercise of delegated authority by the CSC did not violate
nondelegation principles standing alone, the CSC’s exercise of delegated
authority to implement alienage restrictions violated equal protection and
nondelegation principles standing together.63
Right/no-power combination analysis was most recently employed in United
States v. Windsor.64 In striking down portions of the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), the Court drew on not only equal protection and substantive due
process principles, but also principles of federalism.65 DOMA was problematic,
Justice Kennedy reasoned, in part because “the definition and regulation of
marriage . . . has been treated as being within the authority and realm of the
separate States.”66 The statute, by injecting a one-size-fits-all definition of
marriage into federal law, thus reflected a “federal intrusion on state power.”67
It was ultimately “unnecessary to decide,” however, whether this intrusion
alone sufficed to secure the statute’s doom. Instead, the Court took notice of
the statute’s “depart[ure] from th[e] history and tradition of reliance on state
law to define marriage” when it turned to the challengers’ rights-based claims,68
deeming the “State’s power in defining the marital relation” to be “of central
relevance” to those issues as well.69 To be sure, the invocation of federalism values

Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 116.
Id. at 122 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Cf. Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, the Congressional Process, and the
Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J. 1707, 1714 (2002) (characterizing the
holding in Mow Sun Wong as partially derived from nondelegation principles).
64 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013).
65 More accurately, then, Windsor employed a right/right/no-power combination, or, as Justice
Scalia less charitably put it, a holding that DOMA was invalid “maybe on equal-protection grounds,
maybe on substantive-due-process grounds, and perhaps with some amorphous federalism component
playing a role.” Id. at 2707 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66 Id. at 2689-90.
67 Id. at 2692.
68 Id.
69 Id.; see also William D. Araiza, After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Power to Enforce Equal
Protection, and the Challenge of Pointillist Constitutionalism, 94 B.U. L. REV. 367, 391 (2014) (noting that
61
62
63
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in Windsor did not necessarily imply that state-level same-sex marriage prohibitions
posed no constitutional problems; indeed, Obergefell itself would subsequently
confirm that those prohibitions too were invalid.70 But before Obergefell came
down, Windsor gave rise to debates within lower courts as to what the opinion
meant with its Article I aspects subtracted away.71 And Windsor at least suggested
that its holding might have depended on the combined operation of the
Constitution’s limits on federal power and its protections of individual rights.
Although most of the Court’s right/no-power cases impose heightened
constitutional restrictions on the federal government, right/no-power analysis
might occasionally push in the opposite direction, supporting the imposition
of heightened restrictions on state and local governments. Consider in this
respect the Court’s approach to alienage classifications under the Equal
Protection Clause. Notwithstanding the special set of nondelegation rules
reflected in Mow Sun Wong, the Court has in this context tended to review
state action more strictly than federal action. Why? Because, as the Court
observed in Mathews v. Diaz, “It is the business of the political branches of
the Federal Government, rather than that of either the States or the Federal
Judiciary, to regulate the conditions of entry and residence of aliens.”72 In
other words, Congress’s “broad power over naturalization and immigration”
implies a limit on the power of states to make rules about aliens, and this limit
operates in tandem with the rights-based protections of the Equal Protection
Clause to subject state-level alienage restrictions to a relatively stricter form
of constitutional scrutiny.73 Where the federal government is concerned, by
contrast, the “no-power” component of the equation fades from view, thus
resulting in a more lenient form of rights-based analysis overall. Thus, just as
Article I–based limits on federal action can operate to strengthen rights-based
protections against the federal government, so too—as the alienage cases
“Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Windsor combined concepts of due process, equality, and federalism to
render a much more direct verdict on the constitutionality of section 3 of DOMA”).
70 Compare Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (reading the opinion as indecisive
on whether states may prohibit same-sex marriage), with id. at 2709-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (reading
the opinion as decisive on the question).
71 Compare, e.g., Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 379 (4th Cir. 2014) (“Windsor does not teach
us that federalism principles can justify depriving individuals of their constitutional rights . . . .”),
with id. at 398 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (“The U.S. Constitution does not, in my judgment, restrict
the States’ policy choices on this issue. If given the choice, some States will surely recognize same-sex
marriage and some will surely not. But that is, to be sure, the beauty of federalism.”).
72 426 U.S. 67, 84 (1976); see also Brian Soucek, The Return of Noncongruent Equal Protection, 83
FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 180 (2014) (noting that, from a federalism perspective, the Court’s alienage cases
present a “mirror image” to the Court’s Windsor decision, in that the alienage cases effectively provide for
“strict scrutiny when [laws are] passed by states and rational basis review when passed by Congress”).
73 Diaz, 426 U.S. at 79-80, 85; see also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 378 (1971) (“State
laws that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare benefits merely because of their alienage conflict
with these overriding national policies in an area constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government.”).
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illustrate—might preemption-based limits on state action help to strengthen
rights-based protections against the state government. In both circumstances,
an argument about an individual’s rights joins forces with an argument about
the absence of a government’s power to produce an overall conclusion that a
government actor has exceeded the scope of its authority.
C. Power/Power Combinations
A third type of combination argument appeals to the validating force of
multiple constitutional powers. Consider, for example, Chief Justice Marshall’s
opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland.74 McCulloch famously established Congress’s
authority to charter a national bank, notwithstanding the absence of an
enumerated Article I provision on the subject.75 No such provision was
needed, Marshall explained, because Article I vested in Congress the implied
authority to enact a range of “incidental” measures related to the exercise of the
powers it enumerated.76 With that proposition established, however, Marshall
still needed to identify a particular enumerated power from which to imply
the power to incorporate a bank. And here, rather than cite to one particular
clause within Article I, Section 8, he invoked five:
Although, among the enumerated powers of government, we do not find the
word “bank” or “incorporation,” we find the great powers to lay and collect
taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war;
and to raise and support armies and navies. The sword and the purse, all the
external relations, and no inconsiderable portion of the industry of the
nation, are entrusted to its government.77

Marshall thus concluded that a national bank could be characterized as
“beneficial” to the exercise of multiple enumerated powers, rather than one
such power in particular.78

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Id. at 405-12.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 407.
To be clear, it is uncertain whether this passage was intended to assert a series of arguments
in the alternative as opposed to a bona fide power/power combination argument. Perhaps, that is,
Marshall meant to suggest only that each of the five powers mentioned independently supported an
implied legislative authority to charter a national bank. Or perhaps the conclusion was even more
complicated, with some powers being independently sufficient to support a bank and others exerting
mutually dependent support for that conclusion. All we know for sure is that the five powers together
provided a strong enough textual basis for upholding the bank. And to the extent that no one of
these five powers could alone have provided the same, Marshall would have been relying on a
power/power combination argument of some sort.
74
75
76
77
78
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Some fifty years after McCulloch, the Court found a federal power to issue
paper money in a similarly diverse conglomeration of Article I clauses.79 In
Knox v. Lee,80 one of the so-called Legal Tender Cases, the Court deemed it
“allowable to group together any number of [enumerated powers] and infer
from them all that the power claimed has been conferred.”81 With that principle
in mind, the Court concluded that the Legal Tender Act constituted a permissible
means of “carry[ing] into execution the powers created by the Constitution.”82
Among other things, the issuance of paper money made it easier to pay soldiers,
expanded public credit, and helped to alleviate “the overhanging paralysis of
trade” occasioned by the Civil War—all regulatory tasks falling comfortably
within the ambit of different Article I powers.83 This was enough, in the
Court’s view, to demonstrate the Legal Tender Act’s constitutionality,84 and
the Legal Tender Cases would thus stand for the proposition that a “broad and
comprehensive national authority over the subjects of revenue, finance and
currency is derived from the aggregate of the powers granted to the Congress.”85
Not much has happened since then in the world of power/power combination
analysis.86 Even the expansive power-based rulings of the New Deal era did
79 In Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (7 Wall.) 603 (1869), a 4-3 majority had previously denied
the existence of a paper-money authority, concluding that it did not derive from the power to “coin
money,” the power to “declare and carry on a war,” or the powers to regulate commerce and borrow
money, among others. Id. at 616-22.
80 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
81 Id. at 534; see also id. (noting that implied powers could “be deduced fairly from more than
one of the substantive powers expressly defined, or from them all combined”).
82 Id. at 543.
83 Id. at 540-41.
84 As in McCulloch, the Court in Knox never precisely described the mechanism by which the
clauses combined to establish the constitutional validity of paper money. Muddying things further,
Julliard v. Greenman combined a different set of clauses to produce the same basic conclusion, holding
that the power to issue paper money derived from the powers to coin and borrow money “taken together,”
while also emphasizing deference to Congress on the question of the law’s constitutionality. 110 U.S.
421, 448 (1884); see also Gerard N. Magliocca, A New Approach to Congressional Power: Revisiting the
Legal Tender Cases, 95 GEO. L.J. 119, 150-53 (2006) (characterizing Julliard as grounded largely in
the political-question doctrine).
85 Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 303 (1935).
86 Power/power combination arguments have occasionally surfaced in connection with executive
powers as well. Most notably, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Solicitor General
unsuccessfully advanced a power/power combination argument in defense of President Truman’s
wartime seizure of steel mills, contending that “[p]residential power to act on a particular occasion
may derive from more than one of the grants contained in Article II” and that Truman’s “power to
act . . . [had] sprung from all the available clauses.” Brief for Petitioners at 99-100, 343 U.S. 579
(1952) (No. 745). More recently, Justice Thomas advanced a roughly analogous defense of the President’s
authority to try “enemy combatants” by military commission. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557,
678 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution vests in the President ‘[t]he executive Power,’
Art. II, § 1, provides that he ‘shall be Commander in Chief ’ of the Armed Forces, § 2, and places in
him the power to recognize foreign governments, § 3. This Court has observed that these provisions
confer upon the President broad constitutional authority to protect the Nation’s security in the manner
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not expressly rest their decisions on the combined effect of multiple enumerated
powers; rather, those decisions invoked individual powers—most often the
commerce power—as independently sufficient to sustain the federal enactment
under review.87 These decisions, in turn, may have obviated the need for
power/power combination analysis in the modern era: why bother combining the
Commerce Clause with another power-related provision when the Commerce
Clause will most likely suffice to uphold an enactment on its own? But now
that the Court has begun to rein in the commerce power, rendering it something
less than a “blank check” for congressional authority,88 power/power combination
analysis might prove a more relevant and viable option for government attorneys
to consider in future Article I cases.89 If so, some of the Court’s early federal-power
cases may provide a useful blueprint for the making of such claims.

he deems fit.” (emphasis added)). Finally, Professors Posner and Porat have suggested that something
akin to power/power combination analysis drove the Court’s determination in Dames & Moore v. Regan
that President Carter was both statutorily and constitutionally authorized to suspend legal claims against
the Iranian government during the Iran hostage crisis. See Porat & Posner, supra note 8, at 47.
87 See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941);
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
88 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 602 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (holding that the Commerce Clause does not permit Congress
to “regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect
on interstate commerce”).
89 Consider in this respect Chief Justice Roberts’s controlling opinion in National Federation of
Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2011). Though ostensibly voting to uphold
the law as a valid exercise of the taxing power, Roberts reached this conclusion by way of a circuitous,
three-step route. First, he established that the commerce power did not authorize enactment of the
mandate. Id. at 2585-93 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.). Second, he applied a “saving construction” to the
mandate, under which it operated not as a simple command to purchase health insurance, but rather as
a special tax imposed on the non-purchasers of health insurance. Id. at 2593-94. Finally, he demonstrated
that the mandate, so construed, was sustainable under the Taxing Clause. Id. at 2594-95. The three-step
argument thus combined a Commerce Clause claim with a separate Taxing Clause claim: the Commerce
Clause validated a saving construction of the law that Roberts otherwise would have rejected, and
the Taxing Clause established that the law, as read under the saving construction, reflected a valid
exercise of constitutional power. See id. at 2600 (“[T]he statute reads more naturally as a command
to buy insurance than as a tax, and I would uphold it as a command if the Constitution allowed it.
It is only because the Commerce Clause does not authorize such a command that it is necessary to
reach the taxing power question.”). The Chief Justice’s reasoning thus reflected not so much a form
of power/power combination analysis as it did a form of “power/no-power” combination analysis—
perhaps the first of its kind ever to grace the U.S. Reports.
My point, to be clear, is not to suggest that the Chief Justice’s opinion in NFIB v. Sebelius employed
a straightforward form of power/power combination analysis akin to what we encountered in McCulloch
and the Legal Tender Cases. Rather, it is simply to suggest that the Court’s recent limiting of the
commerce power raises new and interesting questions regarding the interactions between Congress’s
enumerated powers—questions of the sort that the Chief Justice grappled with in Sebelius itself.
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D. Subclausal Combinations
I have thus far considered combination arguments that operate across
constitutional clauses. But combination arguments can also arise within the
confines of a single clause. Invoking what I call “subclausal combinations,” the
Court has sometimes merged analytically separate decision rules governing
different aspects of a particular clause’s operation. A single constitutional
clause, in other words, can generate multiple doctrinal subrules, which can
merge together to support combination arguments of their own.
In Plyler v. Doe, for instance, the Court considered an equal protection
challenge to Texas’s practice of denying public education to the children of
undocumented immigrants.90 Then-existing doctrine did not look good for
the challengers: the Court had previously held that education did not qualify
as a fundamental interest91 and that undocumented immigrants did not qualify
as a suspect class.92 But the Court applied heightened scrutiny nonetheless.
Emphasizing the importance of education and the vulnerable position of children
with undocumented status, the Court faulted the law for failing to further a
“substantial goal of the state” (thus applying something stronger than the mere
“legitimate state interest standard” associated with rational basis review).93
Critically, the Court never declared that children of undocumented immigrants
themselves constituted a suspect class for any and all purposes, nor did it
revisit its earlier determination that burdens on educational interests would
generally fail to trigger strict scrutiny in future equal protection cases. But
the Court could at least say that the Texas law at issue, which involved both a
refusal to educate and the targeting of children of undocumented immigrants,
merited heightened equal protection review.94
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 1 (1973).
See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223 (“Undocumented aliens cannot be treated as a suspect class because
their presence in this country in violation of federal law is not a ‘constitutional irrelevancy.’”).
93 Id. at 223-24 (emphasis added). “More is involved in these cases,” the Court explained, “than
the abstract question whether [the Texas law] discriminates against a suspect class, or whether education
is a fundamental right. [The law] imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not
accountable for their disabling status.” Id. at 223; see also HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION
OUTSIDE THE LAW 8 (2014) (“By asking for a substantial goal, the Court signaled that its analysis
might be closer to what is called ‘intermediate scrutiny’—more than a rational basis but less than
strict scrutiny. The Court did not so label its analysis, but it seemed to require that Texas show
something more than a rational basis.”). For similar combination-based reasoning in a similar
context—albeit on the dissenting side of a constitutional decision—see Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 110
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the discrimination inherent in the Texas scheme is scrutinized with
the care demanded by the interest and classification present in this case, the unconstitutionality of that
scheme is unmistakable.” (emphasis added)).
94 See Linda E. Carter, Intermediate Scrutiny Under Fire: Will Plyler Survive State Legislation to Exclude
Undocumented Children from School?, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 345, 376 (1997) (“Ultimately, the Court focused
on the combination of a status over which the children had no control and the nature of the deprivation.”).
90
91
92
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Just as a court might combine discrete decision rules concerning the
application of a single clause, so too might it combine “considerations” or
“arguments” related to the operation of that clause in a particular case. In
United States v. Comstock, for instance, the Court upheld a federal civil
commitment statute as authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause.95
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in Comstock relied on “five considerations”
which, “taken together,” established “that the Constitution grants Congress
legislative power sufficient to enact [the statute].”96 In outlining these five
considerations, Justice Breyer appealed to various propositions of Necessary
and Proper Clause doctrine—including the proposition that “the Necessary
and Proper Clause grants Congress broad authority to enact federal legislation”;97
the further proposition that a longstanding history of congressional regulation
within a particular field can be “helpful in reviewing the substance of a
congressional statutory scheme”;98 and the even further proposition that, “[as]
the custodian of its prisoners,” the federal government “has the constitutional
power to act in order to protect nearby (and other) communities from the
danger federal prisoners may pose.”99 None of these propositions, to be sure,
bore the formal label of a subrule or subprinciple concerning the scope of the
Necessary and Proper Clause, but each proposition drew support from a
different set of cases while bearing relevance to a different feature of the
challenged statutory scheme. In that sense, the Court’s conclusion in Comstock
also rested on a sort of subclausal combination analysis, which looked to
various aspects of Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine in the aggregate,
rather than considering each in isolation.100
Finally, we might identify even subtler variations of subclausal combination
arguments in numerous Supreme Court cases that appeal to combinations of
prior precedents. Each individual precedent sets forth a subclausal decision rule
of its own, reducible to the form of “Where the facts are X, the outcome
should be Y.” And once we accord decision-rule status to the discrete holdings
of individual cases, we start to see subclausal combination arguments popping
up all over the landscape of constitutional doctrine. In Kelo v. City of New
London, for instance, the Court sequentially described three prior Takings
Clause decisions—Berman v. Parker,101 Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,102

95 560 U.S. 126 (2010).
96 Id. at 133.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 137 (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S 1, 21 (2005)).
99 Id. at 142 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320 (1982)).
100 Id. at 149.
101 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
102 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
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and Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.103—before concluding that the decisions
“[v]iewed as a whole” demonstrated the validity of the governmental taking
under review.104 Similarly, in U.S. Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, the Court
quoted seven cases to support the proposition that “the Court . . . has consistently
refused to invalidate on equal protection grounds legislation which it simply
deem[s] unwise or unartfully drawn.”105 And in a bevy of other cases, the Court
has appealed to such phenomena as the “force of our precedents,”106 the “thrust
of our . . . jurisprudence,”107 and “the weight of our decisions,”108 while also
relying on string cites to signal high levels of precedential support for a
particular doctrinal rule.109 In this way, the mundane, workaday business of
citing to collections of precedents turns out to resemble the more unusual and
infrequent practice of citing to collections of constitutional clauses. What
distinguishes the two practices is not so much the structure of the argument
itself as it is the nature of the units being combined.
III. THE LEGITIMACY OF COMBINATION ANALYSIS
Having introduced some examples of combination arguments in constitutional
law, this Article now turns to their analytical structure. The aim of this Part
is twofold: (1) to suggest that logical validity of combination analysis depends
on a small number of plausible and straightforward premises; and (2) to
suggest that the practice bears important structural similarities to other
widespread and well-accepted types of constitutional arguments—namely,
arguments based on the constitutional avoidance canon and arguments that
appeal to considerations of constitutional structure. More specifically, the
discussion here is intended to push back against the claim that combination
analysis is simply too tenuous or radical a method of decisionmaking to
warrant any further legitimation from the courts. That is not to say that
combination analysis should in fact be utilized—the next Part will consider
that question in further detail.110 But it is to suggest that the practice should
not be dismissed on legitimacy-based grounds alone.

467 U.S. 986 (1984).
545 U.S. 469, 480-82 (2005) (emphasis added).
449 U.S. 166, 175-77 (1980).
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 670 (2004).
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 175 (2006).
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 702 (1976).
See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013) (citing four cases to support
the proposition that “[w]e have repeatedly held that such a ‘generalized grievance,’ no matter how
sincere, is insufficient to confer standing”).
110 See infra Part IV.
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
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A. The Additive Logic of Combination Analysis
Combination arguments can be modeled mathematically. Simply put,
courts combine the clauses by adding up or summing together separate
conclusions of partial clausal consistency (or inconsistency) to produce an
overall conclusion of total constitutionality (or unconstitutionality). Just as
my limited desire to see a movie and my limited desire to buy clothes might
together yield an overwhelming desire to go to the mall,111 so too might
clauses providing limited individual support for a judicial result operate
together to generate strong collective support for that result.
Before developing that idea further, let us first consider a model of
constitutional decisionmaking under which combination analysis would not in
fact make much sense. Suppose, for instance, that the Court confronts the
question of whether some act of Congress falls within the scope of its enumerated
powers. The most familiar way of conducting the inquiry is to walk through
the individual clauses of Article I, Section 8, and to ask in binary fashion
whether each such clause does or does not authorize the enactment in question.
Constitutional invalidity is connoted by the number 0, and constitutional
validity by the number 1, with each enumerated power capable of contributing
a score of either 0 or 1. And, indeed, with such a model in place, combination
analysis should never make a difference. If the Court identifies an enumerated
power that authorizes the statute, the constitutional inquiry is over; once a
law garners the one “constitutionality point” that it needs, we have no reason
to keep looking for other authorizing powers.112 Conversely, if no power
authorizes the statute, then combining the powers together will not change
the result, with 0 plus 0 continuing to equal 0. On this simple binary model
of constitutional adjudication, combination analysis will prove to be redundant
on the one hand or fruitless on the other—pointless either way.
There is, however, another way of conceptualizing the inquiry. Suppose
instead that each enumerated power is capable of conferring partial values
between the fully unconstitutional score of 0 and the fully constitutional score
of 1.113 It still remains possible for a single enumerated power to sustain a
111 See Porat & Posner , supra note 8, at 4 (discussing in similar terms the aggregation of reasons
to decline a dinner invitation).
112 Cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993)
(Souter, J., concurring) (noting that “if a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant would actually obtain
an exemption from a formally neutral, generally applicable law under another constitutional provision,
then there would have been no reason for the Court in what Smith calls the hybrid cases to have
mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all”).
113 In many ways, the mechanism I describe here mirrors what Professor James G. Dwyer has
called “the additive view of rights.” James G. Dwyer, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Employment
Division v. Smith for Family Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1786 (2011) (“One would need, in at least
a rough sort of way, to assign some value to each single right, establish some threshold value for a
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congressional enactment on its own—if, for instance, a law scores a 1 out of 1
under the power to coin money, then a court can proceed to uphold the law
without considering the effect of any other enumerated powers. But in other
circumstances, combination analysis will make a difference. If, for instance, a
law garners a score of, say, 0.6 out of 1 under one enumerated power, we now
would be interested to know whether it managed to garner additional support
from some other power.114 Circling back to the Legal Tender Cases, for instance,
one might understand the Court’s reasoning as follows: the Legal Tender Act
received 0.5 constitutionality points from the Commerce Clause, 0.3 points
from the Spending Clause, and perhaps another 0.3 from the Coinage Clause,
yielding an overall score that exceeded the necessary threshold of 1.115
But wait! If a law receives only 0.5 points out of 1 under the Spending
Clause and 0.5 points out of 1 under the Commerce Clause, should it really
be upheld? Should we validate a law that registers a paltry score of 1 total
point out of the 2 possible points available to it? (A score of 1 out of 2, after
all, is mathematically equivalent to a score of 0.5 out of 1, which, ex hypothesi,
should not warrant an outcome in the government’s favor.) Think carefully,
however, about what this add-the-denominators approach would portend. A
law regulating the interstate shipment of milk, for instance, might receive a
full score of 1 out of 1 under the Commerce Clause, but it would also receive
scores of 0 out of 1 under the Militia Clause, 0 out of 1 under the Bankruptcy
Clause, 0 out of 1 under the Piracy and Felonies Clause, and so on, thus giving
it a tiny fraction of the total number of constitutionality points that the powers
have to offer. Adding the denominators together would thus accord huge
right’s triggering heightened review, and assume that the value of each single right is below this threshold,
but then find that adding two such rights together creates a sum that is above the threshold. It is difficult
to know even where to begin with such quantification and calculation.”). It bears emphasizing, however,
that what I am suggesting is only a model. I am not proposing that courts actually start quantifying
constitutionality points and measuring their summations against a predetermined numerical threshold.
Consequently, I part ways with Professor Dwyer insofar as he implies that an additive model of
combination analysis illustrates the infeasibility of the practice. In my view, the additive model helps
to demonstrate its logical validity. As the next Sections demonstrate, there are ways of conducting
this analysis that do not require the Court to resort to complicated mathematical calculations of the
sort this Section has proposed.
114 For the sake of simplicity, I am omitting reference to the Necessary and Proper Clause
throughout this Section. But, it might figure into the analysis either by determining the number of
constitutionality points that each individual clause confers (i.e., “This law scores a 0.2 out of 1 as a
necessary and proper means of implementing the commerce power”), or as a means of “bumping up”
the sum total of points that the clauses together confer (i.e., “This law would receive 0.7 constitutionality
points total under the Commerce and Spending Clauses, and an additional 0.5 constitutionality points
from the Necessary and Proper Clause”).
115 Here I am bracketing the possibility of double counting errors—that is, the possibility that
adding together the constitutionality points conferred by multiple clauses impermissibly magnifies
the significance of a single feature of the law that both clauses deem to be constitutionally significant.
In a subsequent Section, I will consider that possibility in further detail. See infra Section V.B.
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significance to the widespread presence of nonauthorizing powers throughout
the constitutional text, converting each into a reason not to validate a law that
one such power clearly authorizes. Taken to its extreme, this approach would
yield the absurd result of permitting only those exceedingly rare forms of
congressional action that effectuate all of Congress’s enumerated powers at
once. If that absurdity is to be avoided, a combining court must keep the
“constitutionality threshold” constant, unaffected by the number of clauses
on which a combination argument relies.
It does not take much work to explain right/right combination arguments
in similar terms: replace the constitutionality points conferred by powers with
the unconstitutionality points conferred by rights and one easily arrives at the
same result.116 As to right/no-power arguments, some adjustments are required,
but the takeaway remains largely the same. Specifically, rather than stipulate
that each enumerated power is capable of conferring on a federal law only the
bare minimum number of constitutionality points necessary to sustain its
validity under Article I (e.g., up to 1 point where 1 point is needed), we would
now have to entertain the possibility that each power could contribute a
constitutionality score that would be more than sufficient to validate the law
(e.g., up to, say, 1.5 constitutionality points, where only 1 point is needed). If
so, an arguably valid exercise of congressional power might receive from one
enumerated power a score of, say, 1.2 out of 1.5 constitutionality points. But
an individual right could enter the picture and contribute a sufficient number
of negative constitutionality points (say, 0.5) to bring the overall score back
below the 1-point minimum threshold. Right/no-power arguments make sense,
that is, on the added assumption that some constitutionally valid enactments
under Article I might qualify as more valid than others, even when both enactments
are valid enough to pass muster under a power-based clause in isolation.117
116 Indeed, some commentators have characterized Smith’s hybrid rights exception in much the
same terms. See Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation,
Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 393, 430-31 (1994) (arguing that the
Court in Smith reasoned that “the cumulative effect of two or more partial constitutional rights equals
one sufficient constitutional claim”); Stein, supra note 13, at 172-75 (offering an additive interpretation
of hybrid rights under Smith).
117 There remains one final assumption lurking within this account of combination analysis:
namely that the constitutionality or unconstitutionality points associated with each particular clause
can in fact be added together. Even if we understand one clause partially to authorize a congressional
enactment and another clause to do the same, we might nonetheless resist combination analysis on the
ground that the clause-specific conclusions invoke incommensurable units of constitutional measurement.
Saying that 0.5 points under the taxing power plus 0.5 points under the commerce power equals 1
full point under Article I, on this view, would be just as absurd as saying that 0.5 ounces plus 0.5
inches equals 1 full liter. For the math to work, the units need to line up. And perhaps when we are
trying to add one clause-specific conclusion to another, the units simply do not.
I cannot definitively prove that clause-specific conclusions of partial constitutionality (or
unconstitutionality) are in fact commensurable. But I can at least observe that modern legal practice
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B. Doctrinal Analogues
It remains to be asked whether we should accept the premises that make
combination analysis work. Can we sensibly claim that a law “kind of,”
“partially,” or “barely” complies with the dictates of a particular constitutional
clause, or must we always reach the conclusion that the law either fully does
or fully does not comply? I do not have a definitive answer to this question,
and, in some sense, no such answer may exist. We are all free to adopt whatever
metaphysical picture of the clauses we want to adopt, and it is hard for me to
think of any objective criteria by which one such picture would qualify as more
conceptually valid than any another. Some of us might prefer to compare the
clauses to on/off switches, whereas others might prefer to compare them to
sliding scales. We may have good practical arguments for favoring one conception
over the other, but I suspect that any further conceptual debating of the issue
would prove fruitless. There is, I suspect, no “right” or “wrong” view of the
clauses’ metaphysical structure; there are only different metaphors that we may
or may not choose to employ.
What I can point out, however, is that a sliding scale conception of the
clauses’ applicability appears to underlie much of the Court’s constitutional
work. That fact suggests that the key underlying premises of combination
analysis—whatever their abstract conceptual merit—enjoy strong doctrinal
support. At one level, this point should be obvious from Part II of this Article:
the Court’s occasional willingness to use combination analysis necessarily
reveals some level of judicial receptivity to the assumptions that drive it
forward. But the doctrinal support runs deeper than that. For one thing, the
Court and its individual Justices sometimes “talk” about constitutional
provisions in terms that are difficult to square with a strictly binary (and hence
combination-unfriendly) approach to clause-specific questions, conceding, for
example, that some clause-specific questions qualify as close or nonobvious
and that fine-grained distinctions between different forms of conduct can
routinely ascribes additive significance to the different sorts of reasons that courts and litigants
marshal in support of various constitutional conclusions. Adding together reasons for results is a
widespread and well-accepted feature of constitutional argument (recall, for instance, my earlier
discussion of subclausal combination arguments), and constitutional combination analysis fits
comfortably within this practice. See supra Section II.D. And that point should suggest, as a doctrinal
matter, that combination analysis faces no great commensurability-related obstacles. If it is logically
permissible to say that two considerations—each grounded in the Due Process Clause—together
indicate that a law is unconstitutional, then should it not also be logically permissible to say that two
considerations—one grounded in the Due Process Clause and one grounded in the Equal Protection
Clause—do the same? I do not see, in other words, anything special about the clauses qua clauses
that would render the arguments about one clause impossible to assert in combination with the
arguments about another clause. That observation alone, of course, does not conclusively rebut any
commensurability-based objections to combination analysis. But it does at least suggest that the
objection seems to run up against a set of assumptions that are elsewhere regularly embraced.
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translate into fine-grained distinctions as to the conduct’s consistency with a
given constitutional command.118 More importantly, combination analysis
shares significant functional features with two widely utilized tools of constitutional
decisionmaking: namely, the constitutional avoidance canon and arguments based
on constitutional structure. As the remainder of this Section will demonstrate,
the Court’s frequent invocation of avoidance and structural arguments further
bolsters the legitimacy of combination analysis itself.
1. Constitutional Avoidance
The constitutional avoidance canon provides that courts should disfavor
statutory constructions that would potentially run afoul of a constitutional
command.119 Thus, when statutory text can accommodate two or more plausible
readings, and when one of those readings triggers constitutional doubts, the
avoidance canon advises courts to reject the constitutionally problematic reading
in favor of a constitutionally unproblematic alternative. Critically for our purposes,
an avoiding court need not conclude that a disfavored statutory reading would
render the statute definitively unconstitutional; instead, the court need only
conclude that such a reading would potentially cause constitutional problems
in order to favor the alternative reading instead.
On initial inspection, avoidance arguments and combination arguments
may seem unrelated. In fact, however, an avoidance argument turns out to be
its own kind of combination argument—one that combines a tentative conclusion
that a reading of a statute conflicts with its text with a tentative conclusion
that the same reading would conflict with the Constitution to produce a definitive
118 The Justices do not always describe their work in this way. Instead, as Professor Eric Berger
has pointed out, they often employ absolutist rhetoric in defense of their respective positions, even
in cases “lacking obvious answers.” Eric Berger, The Rhetoric of Constitutional Absolutism, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 667, 683 (2015). Even so, the Court’s tendency toward absolutist language is not
uniform, and the Justices sometimes offer less absolutist characterizations of the various degrees to
which different constitutional clauses can support different constitutional results. See, e.g., Navarette
v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1692 (2014) (rejecting a defendant’s Fourth Amendment claim, while
acknowledging that “this is a ‘close case’” (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990)));
NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2646 (2012) (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting)
(referencing the “outer edge of the commerce power”); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417,
496 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that “the Act before us is novel” and that “it skirts a
constitutional edge”); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991) (“While the monetary
comparisons are wide and, indeed, may be close to the line, the award here did not lack objective
criteria.”); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 (1974) (“[T]he difference between the type of relief
barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted under Ex parte Young will not in many
instances be that between day and night.”); see also Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 209
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide
fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading
gradually from one extreme to the other.”).
119 For a helpful overview of the canon, see Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and
Anti-avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 184-89.
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ground for rejecting that reading. The statutory text, by being unclear, provides
some reason not to apply it in a particular way. The constitutional text, by creating
potential grounds for a constitutional violation, provides a separate reason for
doing the same. The constitutional provision and the statutory provision thus
combine to produce an overarching reason for prohibiting the government
from applying the text in a manner that would be both constitutionally and
statutorily contestable.120
Put another way, avoidance arguments do with a constitutional provision
and a statutory provision what full-on combination arguments do with one
constitutional provision and another constitutional provision. And that in
turn suggests that many constitutional combination arguments can be both
framed and understood in avoidance-like terms. Consider in this respect
Justice Breyer’s efforts to read the Copyright Clause “in the light of the First
Amendment” so as to prohibit expansive grants of copyright protection.121
One might understand the argument as follows: The Copyright Clause, read
alone, is unclear as to whether it permits the enactment of statutes like the
ones at issue in Golan v. Holder and Eldred v. Ashcroft. These statutes might
be valid under a broader reading of the Clause, but they might also be invalid
under a narrower reading. But the broader reading, unlike the narrower reading,
gives rise to an additional set of constitutional problems involving the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Those additional problems, while
perhaps not strong enough to warrant straightforward invalidation of the law
on First Amendment grounds, are enough to tip the scale in favor of the narrower
reading of the Copyright Clause—thereby producing the conclusion that the
“Copyright Clause, interpreted in the light of the First Amendment,” forbids
enactment of expansive copyright statutes.122

120 This account of the avoidance canon holds true regardless of whether one views the canon as
a descriptive canon grounded in empirical presumptions about legislative intent, see, e.g., Pub. Citizen
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 466 (1989) (refusing to ascribe to Congress the intent “to press
ahead into dangerous constitutional thickets in the absence of firm evidence that it courted those
perils”), or as a normative canon designed to create and enforce “constitutional rules that raise obstacles
to particular governmental actions without barring those actions entirely.” Ernest A. Young, Constitutional
Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1585 (2000).
On both accounts, the Court determines (a) that a statute potentially offends a constitutional norm
and (b) that the statute can be plausibly read in a way that does not create constitutional difficulties.
The canon-inspired conclusion therefore depends on the combined impact of findings (a) and (b),
regardless of whether the conclusion is framed in terms of a backward-looking claim about congressional
intent or a forward-looking claim about the enforcement of constitutional resistance norms.
121 See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.
122 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 912 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting); cf. John O. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, Essay, The Rights of Legislators and the Wrongs of Interpretation: A Further
Defense of the Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority Rules, 47 DUKE L.J. 327, 347 (1997)
(“[W]henever a provision is ambiguous, we properly read it in light of the rest of the document.”).
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In short, it is not difficult to recast so-called avoidance arguments in
combination-like terms, and vice versa. Instead of imagining the Legal Tender
Act as deriving its validity from the sum total of constitutionality points it
received from multiple Article I powers, we might instead imagine Congress’s
spending power, commerce power, and war-related powers as all providing
reasons to construe the coinage power in a permissive, rather than preclusive
way. Conversely, instead of viewing the First Amendment as providing a reason
to prefer one construction of the Copyright Clause over another, we might
instead view it as imposing a high enough number of unconstitutionality
points on expansive copyright laws to offset the barely sufficient number of
constitutionality points that the Copyright Clause would otherwise confer.
The descriptions are different, but the underlying mechanics are largely the same.
2. Structural Arguments
A second doctrinal analogue to combination analysis involves the use of
so-called structural arguments in constitutional law. These arguments, as
described by Charles Black, eschew “the method of purported explication or
exegesis of the particular textual passage” in favor of “the method of inference
from the structures and relationship created by the constitution in all its parts or
in some principal part.”123 By examining the document holistically, Black argued,
we can identify principles reflecting the big picture purposes and objects of the
framers’ design.124 These background principles, in turn, might operate to
influence the outcomes of some constitutional cases, even when the principles
themselves cannot be derived from a lone provision of the constitutional text.
Courts and commentators have employed a variety of techniques to derive
structural principles of constitutional law, with some emphasizing history, others
emphasizing precedent, and others emphasizing intuition and common sense.125
But there is yet a further, text-based method of identifying structural principles,
which should by now look quite familiar. The idea, in short, is to point to
123 CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 (1969).
124 See id. at 7-31; see also PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION 80 (1982) (“[T]he structural approach, unlike much doctrinalism, is grounded in

the actual text of the Constitution. But, unlike textualist arguments, the passages that are significant
are not those of express grants of power or particular prohibitions but instead those which, by setting
up structures of a certain kind, permit us to draw the requirements of the relationships among the
structures.”). But see Michael C. Dorf, Interpretive Holism and the Structural Method, or How Charles
Black Might Have Thought About Campaign Finance Reform and Congressional Timidity, 92 GEO. L.J.
833, 835-36 (2004) (suggesting that Black has been misread to endorse “a holistic interpretation of
the Constitution,” when in fact his approach focuses principally on “the structure of the government
of the United States of America”).
125 Michael Coenen, Species of Structural Argument, CONCURRING OPINIONS (July 31, 2014),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/07/species-of-structural-argument.html [https://
perma.cc/K9QK-8UFX].
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collections of clauses—rather than one single clause—as giving rise to the structural
principle under consideration. The clauses come together to demonstrate a
textual basis for a structural principle that carries its own constitutional force.
In Alden v. Maine, for example, the Court extended sovereign immunity
protections to cover actions brought under federal law against states in their own
court systems.126 The Court was explicit in rejecting the Eleventh Amendment
as the textual basis for its decision; that provision would not work, it explained,
because its terms applied only to suits in federal court.127 Instead, the Court
characterized its holding as grounded in “a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty
which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which
they retain today . . . .”128 But where did the Constitution recognize this aspect
of state sovereignty? Not in one single clause, but in many different clauses
understood together. There were, for instance, the “[v]arious textual provisions”
that “assume the States’ continued existence and active participation in the
fundamental processes of governance,”129 the “limited and enumerated powers
granted to the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches of the National
Government,”130 and finally the “Tenth Amendment, which, like the other
provisions of the Bill of Rights, was enacted to allay lingering concerns about
the extent of the national power.”131 These provisions together, as the Court
understood them, sufficed to establish that “the founding document ‘specifically
recognizes the States as sovereign entities.’”132
527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999).
Id. at 730.
Id. at 713.
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; id. art. IV, §§ 2–4; id. art. V).
Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. II, §§ 2–3; id. art. III, § 2).
Id. at 713-14.
Id. at 713 (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.15 (1996)). Similar reasoning
appears in other structural decisions. For example, in Printz v. United States, the court stated that
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

[i]t is incontestible that the Constitution established a system of “dual sovereignty.” . . .
This is reflected throughout the Constitution’s text, including (to mention only a few
examples) the prohibition on any involuntary reduction or combination of a State’s territory,
Art. IV, § 3; the Judicial Power Clause, Art. III, § 2, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
Art. IV, § 2, which speak of the “Citizens” of the States; the amendment provision, Article V,
which requires the votes of three-fourths of the States to amend the Constitution; and the
Guarantee Clause, Art. IV, § 4, which “presupposes the continued existence of the states and
. . . those means and instrumentalities which are the creation of their sovereign and reserved
rights.” Residual state sovereignty was also implicit, of course, in the Constitution’s conferral
upon Congress of not all governmental powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones, Art. I,
§ 8, which implication was rendered express by the Tenth Amendment’s assertion that “[t]he
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
521 U.S. 898, 918-19 (1997) (omission in original) (citations omitted); see also U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 802-05 (1995) (citing several provisions of Article I to support the
proposition that “the power to add qualifications [for members of Congress] is not part of the original
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Another rich vein of structural argument runs through the Court’s
separation-of-powers case law, which establishes what Professor John Manning
has described as “a freestanding . . . doctrine that transcends the specific meaning
of any given provision of the Constitution.”133 “Freestanding,” however, may
not always be the right term; in some separation-of-powers cases, the Court
has attempted to base its structural principles on multiple clauses of the text
at once. In Bowsher v. Synar, for instance, the Court cited to, among others, the
Incompatibility Clause of Article I, Section 6, the Appointments Clause of
Article II, Section 2, and the Impeachment Clauses of Article I, Section 3 and
Article II, Section 4 as collectively reflecting a strong constitutional presumption
against congressional encroachments on law-execution responsibilities.134 With
that prohibition established, the Court could then go on to explain why the
budget-sequestration provisions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act “violate
the command of the Constitution that the Congress play no direct role in the
execution of the laws.”135
In a very real sense, the structural reasoning of cases like Alden and Bowsher
might qualify as mega-combination arguments in their own right. Large numbers
of clauses with only limited relevance to a legal issue coalesce to form a
structural principle that carries direct and authoritative relevance to the case at
hand. Article V’s rules governing the amendment of the Constitution may not
tell us much about the proper scope of state sovereign immunity, but they chip
in alongside various provisions of Articles I, II, III, and IV to establish a broad
principle of state sovereignty with central relevance to the question presented
powers of sovereignty that the Tenth Amendment reserved to the States”). See generally John F.
Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV.
2003, 2004 (2009) (“Because multiple clauses assume the continued existence of states and set up a
government of limited and enumerated powers, the Court has inferred that such provisions collectively
convey a purpose to establish federalism and to preserve a significant degree of state sovereignty.”).
133 John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1950 (2011).
134 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986); see also Manning, supra note 133, at 1963 (noting that “the Court
[in Bowsher] gleaned the purpose of strict separation from the overall structure of, and relationship
among, the Vesting Clauses”). For similar examples, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 271-72 (1976)
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) and INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983).
135 Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 736 (Stevens, J., concurring). Arguments of this sort, though not explicitly
purporting to apply the structural method, appear in constitutional scholarship as well. See, e.g.,
Vicki C. Jackson, Holistic Interpretation: Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer and Our Bifurcated Constitution, 53 STAN. L.
REV. 1259, 1284 (2001) (calling for a “holistic approach” to constitutional interpretation that “relies on
a trajectory, or vector that begins with the more recent [constitutional] text, and examines how it affects
understandings of what existed before”); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment,
Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 960 (2002) (justifying constitutional
prohibitions on sex discrimination by reference to a “synthetic” reading of the Fourteenth and Nineteenth
Amendments and their respective enactment histories); Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption
Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 342, 354 n.58 (2009) (advocating for judicial recognition of an
“anti-corruption principle” in constitutional law and deriving that principle, in part, from at least
twenty separate provisions of the Constitution that “were animated by a corruption concern”).
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in Alden v. Maine.136 The Incompatibility Clause may not have much to say
about Congress’s ability to reserve for itself the authority to remove executive
branch officials, but it makes its own small contribution to a bigger picture
suggestion concerning the limited congressional role in the execution of federal
law—a suggestion of sufficient power to invalidate the legislation at issue in
Bowsher v. Synar.137 What the clauses lack in relevance, they make up for in
numerosity—a constitutional principle lacking express textual articulation can
still materialize out of a multitude of thematically related clauses.
The point of this discussion, to be clear, is not to suggest that the Court
engages in argument by combination whenever it invokes considerations of
constitutional structure, or vice versa. Instead, it is simply to highlight an
important point of resonance between combination analysis and structural
reasoning about constitutional law. Combining the clauses, on this account,
involves nothing more than (a) noticing and responding to the fact that the
clauses relate to one another in a thematically salient way and (b) translating that
observation into a newfound constitutional principle that carries authoritative
decisional force. Many of the examples discussed in Part II can be understood
as doing just that.
IV. THE PROS AND CONS OF COMBINATION ANALYSIS
The discussion thus far has attempted to show that combination analysis
qualifies as a doctrinally familiar and conceptually coherent method of
constitutional decisionmaking. But determining that combination arguments
are allowed is not the same thing as determining that they are good. This Part
thus turns to this next question: Should courts utilize combination analysis as
a means of deciding constitutional cases? It begins by sorting out several
“results-neutral” reasons that militate for and against the use of combination
analysis in constitutional cases, the force of which should not depend on one’s
prior commitments to a particular set of constitutional outcomes. The analysis
then turns to the results-oriented dimensions of the problem, asking whether
and to what extent different forms of combination analysis might align with
different substantive visions of constitutional law.
A. Reasons to Combine
1. Avoiding Anomalous Results
Imagine two tort cases, the first involving the negligent operation of a motor
vehicle and the second involving the negligent publication of a defamatory
136
137

See supra notes 126–32 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.
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statement. In the car crash case, the defendant collects $100,000 in compensatory
damages and $1.5 million in punitive damages. In the defamation case, the
defendant collects $100,000 in compensatory damages and $1.2 million in punitive
damages. Outsized ratios between punitive and compensatory damages render
both judgments susceptible to invalidation under due process doctrine, which
disfavors punitive-to-compensatory ratios in excess of ten-to-one.138 But the
defamation case, unlike the car crash case, also presents a potential First
Amendment problem, as the Court has read the Free Speech Clause to limit
recovery in some cases involving negligent acts of defamation.139
Now, let us suppose that an honest, all-things-considered application of
the Court’s punitive damages case law ultimately yields the conclusion that
the $1.5 million punitive damages award in the car crash case violates the Due
Process Clause, while also yielding the conclusion that the $1.2 million award in
the defamation case barely passes muster. Thus, on a purely clause-specific
approach to the problem, the defamation judgment is unconstitutional if and
only if it violates the First Amendment. That analysis will in turn depend on
whether the plaintiff qualifies as a “public figure” or whether the defamatory
statement involved an issue of “public concern.”140 And let us suppose on that score
that a comprehensive application of free speech doctrine yields the conclusions that
(a) the defamation plaintiff, though bearing some of the hallmarks of a public
figure, does not qualify as such; and (b) the subject of the defamatory publication,
though bearing some of the hallmarks of a public issue, does not qualify as
such. Consequently, the defamation judgment counts as constitutionally
permissible as a First Amendment matter, constitutionally permissible as a
due process matter, and hence constitutionally permissible overall.
An anomalous result thus arises: The damages award in the car crash case
presented one and only one constitutional problem. The damages award in
the defamation case was only slightly less problematic from a due process
perspective, but far more problematic from a First Amendment perspective.
That makes the defamation case seem constitutionally worse overall than does
the car crash case, meaning that the invalidity of the defamation judgment
ought to follow a fortiori from the invalidity of the car crash judgment. Yet, a
clause-specific application of Supreme Court case law produces the result that
138 See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003) (“[F]ew awards
exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree,
will satisfy due process.”).
139 See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
140 See id. at 279-82 (prohibiting “a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual
malice’”); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 348-50 (1974) (permitting private-figure
plaintiffs to collect compensatory damages—but not punitive or presumed damages—in cases
involving negligently uttered falsehoods on matters of public concern).
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the car crash judgment warrants constitutional invalidation whereas the
defamation judgment does not. Such an outcome would strike many individuals
as improvident, counterintuitive, and unfair. And it is only by combining the
clauses that the apparent anomaly can be avoided; only by adding together
the free speech and due process difficulties with the defamation judgment can
one demonstrate that it in fact qualifies as constitutionally worse (rather than
better) than its car crash counterpart.141
Generalizing from this example, we reach the central point: combination
analysis facilitates improved forms of analogical reasoning. When deciding a case
in light of previous precedents, courts can compare the overall constitutional picture
of the former with the overall constitutional picture of the latter. Clause-specific
analysis, by contrast, forces the Court to construct precedential walls that obscure
important features from view: if a court cannot combine the First Amendment
with the Due Process Clause when seeking guidance from past First Amendment
and due process precedents, then its evaluation of the case will be distorted. It
must ignore the First Amendment features of the case when applying due
process precedents, and it must ignore the due process features of the case when
applying First Amendment precedents. And that, in turn, increases the
likelihood that the Court will render a judgment that seems to be at odds with
common sense, either by validating government action that seems constitutionally

141 Professor Faigman identifies an analogous sort of anomaly as arising from the Court’s
decision in McCleskey v. Kemp, in which the claimant challenged a capital sentence on both Eighth
Amendment and Equal Protection grounds. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). In deciding McCleskey, as Professor
Faigman notes, “the Court divided the two amendments and found the Georgia capital sentencing
scheme constitutional as against each.” Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality, supra note 8, at 776. So
constructed, however, the Court’s analysis failed to offer an “accurate gauge” of the extent of the
petitioner’s true injury. Id. Under the clause-specific approach, McCleskey’s death sentence was
“divided into its constituent parts,” where in fact “it is hard to imagine how the injury felt by the
challenger could be suffered in any way other than in toto.” Id. Put somewhat differently, it is
unrealistic to think that the overall constitutional harm suffered by McCleskey would have been
qualitatively less significant than the overall harm suffered by an individual with a somewhat
stronger Eighth Amendment claim and a nonexistent equal protection claim or by an individual
with a somewhat stronger equal protection claim and a nonexistent Eighth Amendment claim. But
the clause-specific reasoning of McCleskey implausibly suggested otherwise.
Consider also Professor Kimberlé Crenshaw’s suggestion that courts marginalize the experiences
of women of color when they separately and sequentially examine the race and gender dimensions of
employment discrimination claims. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex:
A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Policies, 1989 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 139. By failing to “combine these categories,” courts systematically overlook an
“intersectional experience” that “is greater than the sum of racism and sexism.” Id. at 140, 151. Put differently,
by refusing “to acknowledge that Black women encounter combined race and sex discrimination,” courts
undervalue the harms associated with a variety of discriminatory practices. Id. at 142-43. Here, too, the
absence of combination-based reasoning yields a set of distorted and seemingly anomalous judicial
results. See Abrams & Garrett, supra note 8, at 19-20 (discussing Crenshaw’s work in similar terms).

1104

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 1067

worse than past actions it has invalidated, or by invalidating government action
that seems constitutionally better than past actions it has allowed.142
2. Narrowness and Transparency
Combination analysis might also prove useful to a court wishing to narrow
the scope of a doctrinal holding. This point may seem counterintuitive:
combination analysis, after all, both draws from and contributes to multiple
doctrinal areas at once and would thus seem to amplify, rather than diminish,
the precedential implications of a given judicial holding. The breadth of a
decision, however, cannot be measured solely in terms of the number of
different clauses whose decision rules it affects; of no less importance is the
range of different fact patterns for which the holding will carry force.143 And
on this metric, combination-based holdings will sometimes qualify as narrower
than their clause-specific counterparts, furnishing courts with an effective
means of limiting the precedential sweep of the holdings they pronounce.
Recall Justice Black’s opinion in Griffin v. Illinois, which concluded that
the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause together prohibited
Illinois from requiring defendants to pay a transcript fee as a condition of
filing a criminal appeal.144 The reasoning of the opinion may not have been
narrow in an absolute sense, but it was likely narrower than it would have
been if Justice Black had invoked only the Equal Protection Clause or only the
Due Process Clause as the basis for the Court’s decision. Why? Because each
of the two clauses helped in its own way to make a particular aspect of the
case’s fact pattern relevant to the Court’s legal reasoning. The Equal Protection
Clause rendered relevant the fact that the Illinois transcript fee imposed disparate
burdens on the basis of wealth.145 And the Due Process Clause rendered
relevant the fact that the transcript fee limited access to procedural rights in
the criminal setting.146 By relying on both clauses, the Griffin plurality could and
did construct an opinion about both wealth-based classifications and the criminal
justice system together, rather than a broader “equal protection–only” opinion
about wealth-based classifications inside and outside of the criminal justice
142 See Porat & Posner, supra note 8, at 57 (noting, with respect to private law, that “[n]ormative
aggregation should improve the substantive law, in the sense of vindicating values and policy choices
that are already found in the law, but which defendants can violate if claims are not aggregated”).
143 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 10-11 (1999).
144 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (plurality opinion); see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 110 (1996)
(“Concerning access to appeal in general, and transcripts needed to pursue appeals in particular,
Griffin is the foundation case.”).
145 Griffin, 351 U.S. at 16 (“Providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike
is an age-old problem.”).
146 Id. at 17 (“Such a law would make the constitutional promise of a fair trial a worthless thing.”).
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system, or a broader “due process–only” opinion about discriminatory and
nondiscriminatory rules of criminal procedure. Put differently, by grounding
its reasoning in two clauses rather than one, the plurality in Griffin helped to
confine the precedential scope of the opinion to the narrowed zone of overlapping
territory that the two clauses shared.
None of this means that combination analysis is necessary to the issuance of
narrow doctrinal holdings: the clauses certainly can give rise to highly fact-specific
holdings on their own. And even in cases that might lend themselves to
combination-based reasoning, a pro-minimalism but anti-combination court
could still render a narrow holding by dictating that additional factual features of
a case do in fact bear relevance to the application of a seemingly unrelated clause.
The Court might have held in Griffin, for instance, that the Equal Protection
Clause carries special force in cases involving criminal appeals, while taking
pains not to mention the Due Process Clause. Alternatively, it could have said that
the Due Process Clause carries special force when the government discriminates
on the basis of wealth, while taking pains not to mention the Equal Protection
Clause. If the Court is determined enough to narrow without combining, it
can always do so by simply specifying that its holding should extend no further
than the particular factual scenario to which it applies.
But while this alternative strategy can certainly produce narrowness, it
will often do so at the expense of introducing new problems related to the
overall coherence of the doctrine writ large. If, for instance, the Court were
to render an “equal protection–only” holding emphasizing the special procedural
value of the right to appeal, it would be introducing into its equal protection
doctrine a set of orphaned, quasi–due process precedents with an uncertain
connection to the lion’s share of access-to-justice cases. Likewise, if the Court
were to render a “due process–only” holding that emphasized equality-related
values, it would be introducing into its due process doctrine a set of quasi–equal
protection precedents with an uncertain connection to the lion’s share of cases
dealing with wealth-based classifications. By invoking both of the clauses and
precedents associated with these values, by contrast, the Court can more precisely
situate its holding within the existing universe of its prior cases—explicitly
drawing from, and contributing to, all the relevant lines of doctrine with
thematic relevance to the case under review.147
147 Consider in this respect the conclusion—shared by Chief Justice Roberts and the four joint
dissenters in NFIB v. Sebelius—that the Commerce Clause did not authorize enactment of the so-called
individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); see
also id. at 2647 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting). These Justices repeatedly alluded
to the values of individual autonomy and economic liberty in rendering a decision about Congress’s
power to regulate interstate commerce. See, e.g., id. at 2589 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (noting that the
government’s position would “authorize[] Congress to . . . compel citizens to act as the Government
would have them act” and that “[t]his is not the country the Framers of our Constitution envisioned”);
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This observation in turn supports one further conclusion related to the
transparency of judicial decisionmaking. Judges may sometimes decide cases
in at least partial reliance on values not directly linked to the particular
constitutional issue they have been asked to decide (e.g., “I intend to strike
down this law under the Equal Protection Clause in part because I do not like the
way it undermines an important procedural value”). They may simultaneously
be loath to draw attention to these aspects of their reasoning, dismissing such
value-driven thinking as irrelevant to the actual legal question presented by
the case. But constitutional doctrine already operationalizes a wide range of
value-based judgments. And when judgments of this sort are inwardly motivating
a judge’s reasoning, clause-based combination analysis provides a means of
expressing those judgments in a manner that is both doctrinally grounded and
publicly available for everyone else to see. The point, in other words, is that
judicial decisions might sometimes turn on hidden, value-driven arguments that
instead could take the form of open, clause-based combination arguments. If
that is true, increased acceptance of combination analysis might carry with it the
salutary, transparency-promoting effect of better aligning the public reasoning
of judges’ opinions with the internal thought processes of the judges themselves.

id. at 2602 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (expressing the concern that “individual liberty would suffer” from
a decision that embraced “a system that vests power in one central government”); id. at 2646 (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“Congress has impressed into service third parties . . .
who could be but are not customers of the relevant industry . . . .”); id. (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, &
Alito, JJ., dissenting) (“If Congress can reach out and command even those furthest removed from an
interstate market to participate in the market, then the Commerce Clause becomes a font of unlimited
power . . . .”). The liberty-laden language of their opinions caught the eye of Justice Ginsburg, who
accused her colleagues of “plant[ing] . . . in the Commerce Clause” arguments and considerations
more generally associated with the Due Process Clause. Id. at 2623 n.8 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice Roberts and the four joint dissenters, in other words, had
managed to invoke the values of substantive due process, but not the law of substantive due process,
as a reason to hold that the mandate exceeded Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.
To the extent that these Justices were attempting to make an argument of this sort, they were
asserting a value-based but not clause-based combination argument analogous to what we have
considered in this Section. Not surprisingly, their reliance on such reasoning presages doctrinal
confusion down the road. Did the Justices really intend, as Justice Ginsburg suggested, to embed a set
of substantive due process protections within the law of the Commerce Clause? If so, what, if any,
connection did they see between these new protections and the wide range of other autonomy-based
protections that the Court has already recognized exclusively in the substantive due process context?
The Justices likely had good political reasons for omitting reference to the Due Process Clause in
their decision. See Jamal Greene, What the New Deal Settled, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 265, 280-84
(2012) (identifying several such reasons). But as a doctrinal matter, the Justices would have rendered
a more coherent and persuasive opinion if they had grappled with the liberty-related precedents of
the Due Process Clause when voicing their liberty-based objections to the mandate itself.
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3. Decisional Foreshadowing
I earlier suggested an analogy between combination analysis and the
constitutional avoidance canon, noting that combination arguments and
avoidance arguments can both be understood as citing to one legal provision
as a reason to apply another provision in a particular way.148 It should come
as no surprise that combination arguments—like constitutional avoidance
arguments—sometimes enable courts to avoid resolving a contested issue of
constitutional law. To be sure, the avoidance achieved by combination analysis is
by no means complete, as combination arguments still require courts to produce
a definitive judgment of a constitutional nature. But the type of constitutional
judgment rendered can at least partially avoid deciding once and for all how
a particular clause might bear on a given constitutional question. And that
feature of combination analysis might sometimes prove useful to a court looking
to offer provisional, non-definitive guidance regarding an open constitutional
issue. Call this the value of decisional foreshadowing.
Decisional foreshadowing may help to explain the Court’s use of
combination-based reasoning in United States v. Windsor.149 Why did the
Court resolve the case by reference to the combined effect of rights-based and
“no-power”-based arguments? A likely explanation involves the majority’s
twin desires to (a) highlight its constitutional doubts regarding the validity
of state-level same-sex marriage bans and (b) leave ultimate resolution of that
issue for a future case.150 If these were the Court’s aims, then neither the Fifth
Amendment nor Article I alone would have provided an adequate basis for
the Court’s holding. As to the Fifth Amendment, the Court has generally
interpreted both equal protection and substantive due process principles to
apply coextensively across federal and state regimes,151 meaning that any
attempt to strike down DOMA as a standalone violation of the equal protection
or substantive due process components of the Due Process Clause (or even those
two protections in combination) would have carried direct implications for
analogous state-law issues, including those related to the validity of state-level

See supra subsection III.B.1.
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689-96 (2013); supra Section II.B.
See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Sidney Tarrow, Strange Bedfellows: How an Anticipatory
Countermovement Brought Same-Sex Marriage into the Public Arena, 39 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 449, 456
(2014) (“[T]he Court’s opinion with respect to DOMA indicated that while a majority of the justices
were sympathetic to the cause of same-sex marriage, they were not yet ready to guarantee a nationwide
right to it.”); Linda C. McClain, From Romer v. Evans to United States v. Windsor: Law as a Vehicle for
Moral Disapproval in Amendment 2 and the Defense of Marriage Act, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 351,
461 (2013) (“Windsor is a combination of judicial minimalism and avoidance, on the one hand, and,
on the other, a robust (or more maximalist) vision of equality and the status of equal citizenship.”).
151 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 217 (1995).
148
149
150
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same-sex marriage bans.152 And while an exclusively Article I–based holding
would have left the state-level question undisturbed, it would have prevented
the majority from satisfying its apparent desire to signal openness to the
possibility of establishing a more general prohibition on both state-based and
federal-based infringements on the marital rights of same-sex couples.153 By
combining its Article I concerns with its Fifth Amendment concerns, the
Court managed to have its cake and eat it too, offering powerful rhetorical
ammunition to the challengers of state-level same-sex marriage bans, while
insulating itself against the charge of having decided too much too soon.
Might the Court in Windsor have achieved these goals in another way? Could
the Court, for instance, have invalidated DOMA under Article I alone, while
then going on to offer dicta about the likely unconstitutionality of state-level
same-sex marriage bans? One senses that superfluous musings about the
Fourteenth Amendment would not as effectively have served the aims of the
Windsor majority, precisely because such language could have been dismissed as
mere dicta in future cases. What the Court put in place instead was a rights-based
argument that was neither fully superfluous to nor fully dispositive of the
judgment itself. And it was able to do this by relying on a right/no-power
argument. Lower courts (and a future Court) could not automatically dismiss
Windsor’s rights-based analysis as unnecessary to the case’s result; rather, its
rights-based analysis appeared to have played a nearly, but not quite,
dispositive role, pushed along by the added “oomph” supplied by the Court’s
Article I concerns. And for anyone who takes the dicta–holding distinction
seriously, that point makes all the difference. Because the Court’s discussion of
the Fifth Amendment actively contributed to the result in Windsor, its discussion
had to carry at least some precedential force in future Fourteenth Amendment
cases—including, most importantly, cases concerning the constitutionality of
state-level same-sex marriage bans. And, sure enough, Windsor managed to
do just that, with the Court itself in Obergefell frequently citing to Windsor as
supportive of its ultimate rights-based conclusion.154
To be sure, combination arguments need not always foreshadow future
decisions in a Windsor-like way; it all depends on how a court frames its
discussion of the clauses being combined. The Court in Windsor, for instance,
152 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“My guess is that the majority, while reluctant
to suggest that defining the meaning of ‘marriage’ in federal statutes is unsupported by any of the
Federal Government’s enumerated powers, nonetheless needs some rhetorical basis to support its pretense
that today’s prohibition of laws excluding same-sex marriage is confined to the Federal Government
(leaving the second, state-law shoe to be dropped later, maybe next Term).” (footnote omitted)).
153 It might also have resulted in unduly restrictive limits on Congress’s ability to promulgate
laws related to the institution of marriage more generally. Cf. id. at 2705 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that a federalism-only rationale for the decision would have been “impossible, given the
Federal Government’s long history of making pronouncements regarding marriage”).
154 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590, 2597, 2599-2601 (2015).
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could have held that DOMA was unconstitutional only because Article I
operated in conjunction with the Fifth Amendment to condemn the law. That
holding would have decided considerably more than the actual holding of
Windsor, establishing that the Court’s equal protection and due process concerns
did not provide a sufficient basis for invalidating DOMA. That point, in turn,
would have implied that the Fourteenth Amendment on its own did not condemn
state-level analogues to DOMA, at least without the assistance of some other
constitutional command. But the Court did not frame its analysis in this way;
rather, it merely claimed that Article I helped to demonstrate DOMA’s invalidity
as a matter of rights-based doctrine, while remaining cryptic as to whether that
rights-based doctrine on its own could have produced the same result. The
difference, in other words, is between (a) citing a combination of clauses as
sufficient to support a given result and (b) citing a combination of clauses as both
necessary and sufficient to support that result. The former holding leaves open the
possibility that one of the combined clauses might generate the same outcome
on its own, whereas the latter holding definitively forecloses that possibility.
A final observation bears mentioning: Not everyone will agree that the
decision-foreshadowing technique represents an unambiguous good. Indeed,
precisely because it offers an intermediate path between avoiding an issue
altogether and deciding that issue definitively, decisional foreshadowing can be
attacked by minimalists and maximalists alike. For instance, advocates of a robust
same-sex marriage right could have attacked Windsor for needlessly postponing
a doctrinal development that would have provided immediate benefits to many
same-sex couples. Conversely, proponents of minimalism and/or issue avoidance
might have criticized the Windsor opinion for bothering to bring up the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses at all, given the alternative possibility
of deciding the case exclusively on federalism grounds. The arguments I have
offered here do not purport to address these potential criticisms; rather, they
merely assume that courts might sometimes have good reason to signal future
results without fully etching them into stone. But ultimately, the strength of
this last reason to combine—and perhaps even the question of whether it is
better classified as a reason not to combine—depends on varying sensibilities
regarding the proper role of judges in a constitutional system.
B. Reasons Not to Combine
1. Textual Fidelity
An initial reason not to combine stems from concerns about potential
disconnects between the rules created by combination analysis and the rules
enshrined in the text of the Constitution itself. This “fidelity”-based objection
shares much with Professor John Manning’s critique of structural arguments
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in constitutional law.155 When a court extracts high-generality constitutional
principles from a series of low-generality textual provisions it ignores “an
important element of the lawmaker’s choice”—namely, the decision to embed
within the text a series of specific provisions, rather than a general statement
of constitutional purpose or principle.156 The generality level of each clause
is itself the product of pre-enactment bargains and compromises—bargains
and compromises that helped to secure the public support necessary to endow
the document with legally binding effect. Combining these clauses, the
argument goes, displaces the intended arrangement of bargains and compromises
with alternative propositions that have not themselves been codified. Just as it
would be problematic for the Court to decide a case by reference to an
imaginary Twenty-Eighth Amendment of its own creation, so too, the
argument goes, would it be problematic for the Court to enforce abstract
principles of constitutional law that operate at a higher level of abstraction than
the concrete and specific stipulations we see in the text itself. Combination
arguments warrant rejection, the argument concludes, because they support
unfaithful readings of the text.
Even conceding that the premises of this objection are accurate,157 we
must take care not to overstate its reach. Worries about textual fidelity carry
maximum force when the number of combined clauses is high, the level of
generality of those clauses is low, and the result of the combination is a broad
and widely applicable proposition of constitutional law. (Some plausible targets
of criticism might include, for instance, Justice Douglas’s efforts to derive a
constitutional right to privacy from the combined force of the First, Third,
Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments,158 or Justice Kennedy’s reliance on
various provisions of Articles I, II, III, IV, and V to establish a broad principle
of state immunity from suit.159) But most of the combination arguments we have
considered are less ambitious, invoking only two (or maybe three) high-generality
provisions for the purpose of resolving cases that implicate each individual
provision in a relatively straightforward manner. These arguments do not so
much create new constitutional principles out of thin air as they merely take
notice of and respond to genuine areas of textual convergence. Does it really
displace or ignore the constitutional text to suggest that the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses together subject rules of criminal procedure to
heightened nondiscrimination requirements—requirements that plausibly raise
155 See generally Manning, supra note 132 (discussing the use of structural arguments in federalism
cases); Manning, supra note 133 (discussing the use of structural arguments in separation-of-powers cases).
156 Manning, supra note 132, at 2040.
157 That is to say, let us take for granted that fidelity to the constitutional text is in fact a desirable
objective for judges to pursue. But see Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381 (1997).
158 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
159 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713-14 (1999).
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both due process and equal protection concerns? What about when a court
suggests that the First Amendment and Copyright Clause together limit
Congress’s authority to remove works from the public domain? There certainly
may be instances in which combination arguments end up looking too much like
revisions or additions to the constitutional text, but that is a far cry from saying
that combination arguments are intrinsically prone to produce such results.
The fidelity-based critique must also confront some potentially combinationfriendly signals that lurk within the text itself. The Necessary and Proper Clause
of Article I, Section 8, for instance, vests in Congress the power to make “all
laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution.”160 Might
that Clause’s reference to “the foregoing Powers” (as opposed to, say, “each of
the foregoing Powers”) lend textual support for combination-based measures
of the sort the Court considered in McCulloch v. Maryland and the Legal Tender
Cases? Many right/right combination arguments, moreover, involve provisions
of the Bill of Rights that apply against the states by virtue of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.161 Does combining one incorporated
element of a Clause with another such element create any obvious tension with
the singular nature of the Clause itself? And what of the Ninth Amendment?
Even if the Court has rejected the idea that the provision gives rise to judicially
enforceable constitutional rights,162 might it still provide some textual basis
for enforcing only partially extratextual rights—that is, rights whose content
derives from the clauses’ combined effects?163
Finally, the fidelity-based critique of combination analysis may face
difficulties posed by the unitary structure of the Constitution itself. If, in
other words, courts are to read the Constitution “as a single document” that
reflects a coherent set of principles and purposes,164 then the value of textual
fidelity might sometimes favor rather than disfavor a combination-friendly
approach. Rigid clause specificity, on this view, would sometimes yield unfaithful
and unduly blinkered readings of the text, rendering judges unresponsive to
important textual resonances that exist across the document’s constituent
parts. With combination analysis, by contrast, judges can generate results that
better comport with the text understood as a whole.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3034 (2010) (noting that the Court has
incorporated “almost all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights” into the Fourteenth Amendment).
162 But see Griswold, 381 U.S. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (invoking the Ninth Amendment
as a potential source of unenumerated rights).
163 See Glenn H. Reynolds, Penumbral Reasoning on the Right, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1333, 1345
(1992) (“[W]e should read the Ninth Amendment, in part, as a command to use penumbral reasoning
in the rights area since only by doing so can we avoid ‘denying or disparaging’ rights not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution . . . .”).
164 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 908 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
160
161
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Whatever the strength of these text-based claims, the central point is that
combination analysis, though certainly capable of producing extra-textual
principles of constitutional law, is by no means guaranteed to do so. Combination
arguments do not always require the construction of high-generality structural
principles out of low-specificity textual building blocks. Instead, combination
arguments can, and very often do, reflect the simpler, more textually grounded
insight that multiple, high-generality clauses each provide some, but not
overwhelming, support for a particular constitutional result. And when that
is the case, textual fidelity provides no good reason against—and may even
provide a good reason for—examining these conclusions collectively rather
than in isolation. In sum, considerations of textual fidelity may require a
tempering of combination analysis in its most expansive and creative forms,
but they do not require an eschewal of combination analysis in any and all cases.
2. Judicial Restraint
A related objection would suggest that combination analysis threatens
values of judicial restraint. This objection would concede that combination
arguments—if properly executed—can sometimes cohere with permissible
readings of the constitutional text. But still, the objection would continue,
such arguments present an intolerable invitation to judicial usurpations of
power. By ignoring bright-line boundaries between and among the clauses, the
argument goes, we would make it too easy for creative judges to inject their
policy preferences into constitutional law. The widespread aversion to Justice
Douglas’s combination-based reasoning in Griswold, for instance, reflects worries
that analogous reasoning could be used to justify or repudiate virtually any
conceivable set of unenumerated individual rights.165 Proponents of federalism
might similarly worry that power/power combination arguments (analogous
to what we saw in McCulloch v. Maryland and the Legal Tender Cases) would
enable ultra-nationalist judges to uphold every conceivable congressional
enactment against Article I attack.166 And that is to say nothing of the various
structural principles and purposes that might lurk in hyper-combinations of
165 See, e.g., Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right To Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 715, 722 (2010)
(“‘Penumbras and emanations’ has become an in-joke around the law schools as shorthand for
activist constitutional adjudication, an invitation for the Court ‘to protect those activities that enough
Justices to form a majority think ought to be protected and not activities with which they have little
sympathy.’” (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 99 (1991))).
166 Cf. Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 582 (1870) (Chase, C.J., dissenting) (“[W]e reject
wholly the doctrine, advanced for the first time, we believe, in this court, by the present majority,
that the legislature has any powers under the Constitution which grow out of the aggregate of powers
conferred upon the government, or out of the sovereignty instituted by it. If this proposition be
admitted, and it be also admitted that the legislature is the sole judge of the necessity for the exercise
of such powers, the government becomes practically absolute and unlimited.”).
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ten, fifteen, or fifty different constitutional provisions. It may not be too
difficult, for instance, for a cagey economoid to derive from all the Constitution’s
clauses a single, superseding instruction to maximize the social welfare of
“We the People,” thus reducing all acts of constitutional adjudication to the
case-by-case application of cost–benefit analysis.
These arguments reflect legitimate concerns, but they too likely overstate
the added degree of judicial mischief that combination arguments enable. We
already place significant trust in judges when we empower them to enforce
open-ended textual provisions like the First Amendment, the Equal Protection
Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and other clauses whose broad language
could accommodate a virtually unlimited range of bad-faith, results-oriented
outcomes. How much further leeway for bad-faith judging is really afforded
by permitting reliance on combination arguments—arguments that, like their
clause-specific counterparts, remain subject to evaluation and criticism by
outside observers? It seems inconsistent, in other words, to accept the significant
risk of judicial abuse that comes with the power of judicial review, while at the
same time invoking the specter of judicial abuse as a reason for rejecting all
combination arguments outright—a bit like equipping one’s army with powerful
weapons while worrying about what would happen if it also had knives.
3. Doctrinal Complexity
Combination arguments, we have seen, can promote judicial outcomes
that seem more nuanced and consistent in light of one another.167 But that
sort of decisionmaking tends to carry with it the concomitant cost of a more
intricate body of doctrinal rules.168 The Constitution contains a small number
of clauses, meaning that a strictly clause-specific approach to adjudication
should also yield a small number of different bodies of law. When combination
arguments enter the picture, however, courts and litigants must confront an
expanded set of operative constitutional principles, rooted in the exponentially
large number of combinations that can be assembled from the constituent clauses
of the text.169 And even where an absence of combination-based reasoning has
left the case law finite and simple for the time being, the threat of further
complexity looms on the horizon. In a combination-permissive world, it is
not enough for a government lawyer to defend a law by demonstrating that it
comports with the restrictions of Clause A, the restrictions of Clause B, and
and the restrictions of Clause C. That same lawyer must now worry about the
See supra subsection IV.A.1.
Cf. Porat & Posner, supra note 8, at 56 (noting that normative aggregation can “create an
unacceptable level of difficulty and uncertainty”).
169 Specifically, if the Constitution has N clauses, it is capable of yielding 2N –1 different combinationbased arrangements (including the set of standalone rules associated with each individual clause).
167
168
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possibility that a court will find a constitutional violation in the combined
operation of Clauses A and B, Clauses B and C, Clauses A and C, or perhaps
even in a new doctrinal principle emerging from the collective force of all three
clauses together. Only a hard-and-fast prohibition on the use of combination
arguments would suffice to eliminate these additional contingencies.
Real as they may be, however, concerns about complexity do not provide
a compelling reason for rejecting combination analysis out of hand. For one
thing, we must be careful not to overstate the baseline simplicity of clause-specific
law. It is an oversimplification to say that a Constitution with N clauses would
yield no more than N bodies of clause-specific doctrine. These bodies of
doctrine subdivide, and their subdivisions inject substantial complexity into legal
doctrine. We do not often speak of a single body of rules concerning, say, the
Equal Protection Clause, or the Takings Clause, or the Commerce Clause.
Rather, we speak of many different sub-areas of Equal Protection Clause
doctrine, Takings Clause doctrine, and Commerce Clause doctrine, each with
its own contested principles and uncertain boundaries. Within the “single”
body of equal protection case law, we have cases dealing with race-based
classifications,170 sex-based classifications,171 purposeful and nonpurposeful
discrimination,172 class-of-one claims,173 voting rights,174 peremptory challenges,175
and the U.S. presidential election of 2000.176 Within the single category of
Takings Clause doctrine, we have cases dealing with, among other topics, total
regulatory takings,177 partial regulatory takings,178 permanent physical takings,179
conditional permits,180 and public–private development partnerships.181 And
within the single category of Commerce Clause doctrine, we have cases dealing
with the regulation of items in interstate commerce,182 the regulation of activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce,183 the regulation of the channels of
interstate commerce,184 and the mandated purchasing of commercial products,185
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
See, e.g., Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591 (2008).
See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
See, e.g., Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
See, e.g., NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587-91 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at
2644-50 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
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to say nothing of the huge body of dormant Commerce Clause cases and the
many subdivisions they reflect.186 Different types of fact patterns, in short,
trigger different sets of decision rules, even where the different fact patterns
themselves implicate the same provision of the constitutional text.
All of this suggests that the complexity of constitutional doctrine depends
primarily on the level of fact-specificity with which the Court pitches its
holdings—not on the total number of clauses (or combinations of clauses)
that the Court is permitted to invoke.187 Combination arguments, to be sure,
can contribute to this complexity precisely because they tend to promote the
fact-specific resolution of cases.188 But courts can and very often do render
highly fact-specific judgments without any assistance from combination-based
reasoning. And even when they do combine the clauses, courts can still limit
the fact-specificity of their reasoning and thus, by extension, the magnitude
of a decision’s complexity-increasing effects. (Doctrinal complexity would only
marginally increase, for instance, on account of the Court’s holding that two
clauses together required application of a bright-line decision rule in an easily
identifiable set of cases.) If complexity is the relevant evil, then combination
analysis is not the primary evildoer: removing all combination arguments from
the doctrine seems neither necessary nor especially likely to reduce doctrinal
complexity in a significant way.
But what about the related set of concerns stemming from the mere
possibility of a combination argument carrying weight in future cases? What
do we tell the unfortunate government lawyer who must consider all seven
possible permutations of Clauses A, B, and C when anticipating a challenge
to a law that is independently vulnerable under each provision? This is a fair
concern, but there is reason to wonder how much combination analysis is itself
contributing to the government lawyer’s plight. Even without combination
analysis in the picture, the lawyer must consider any number of different
contingencies—perhaps the court will emphasize one set of facts over another
when applying Clause A, or perhaps it will emphasize one line of precedents
over another when applying Clause B. Perhaps it will apply a heightened
standard of review when applying Clause B but still sustain the law. Perhaps
it will apply a more lenient standard of review when applying Clause C but
still strike down the law. And perhaps it will overrule, or strain hard to avoid,
a prior precedent along the way. Combination arguments do add further
possibilities to the range of analytical methods a case might invite. But this

See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).
Cf. Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J.
1, 14 (1992) (characterizing the use of fact-specific interest-balancing in constitutional law as a
“decision methodolog[y] that vastly complexif[ies] the system”).
188 See supra subsection IV.A.2.
186
187
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added complexity must be understood in relation to the large number of
contingencies that the lawyer must anticipate already.
To be clear, the suggestion is not that problems of complexity and
unpredictability should be irrelevant to the question of whether to combine
the clauses in a particular case, or even, perhaps, to the question of whether a
particular set of clauses should ever be combined. A court might reasonably
cite complexity concerns, for instance, in declining to hold that a large
punitive damages award in a defamation case triggers a combined violation
of the Due Process Clause and First Amendment. “The constitutional law of
defamation [or of punitive damages],” a court might say, “is complex and
unpredictable enough as it is, so we are not going to consider the clauses’
combined effect in this case, period.” That may well be a sensible judgment
as far as it goes, and nothing in my analysis should be taken to suggest
otherwise. But the complexity and unpredictability costs that arise from the
combination of clauses are not so great as to warrant a complete prohibition
on their use. Those costs are better dealt with at the retail level, acting as
concerns worth attending to when considering whether, when, and how to
incorporate a particular instance of combination-based reasoning into a
particular area of constitutional doctrine.
C. Visions of the Constitution
The analysis thus far has appealed to values that do not directly relate to
a particular substantive vision of what the U.S. constitutional regime ought
to look like. Regardless of how one feels about, say, the development of
robust, federalism-based limits on national power, one will likely regard the
potential avoidance of anomalous results as a positive rather than negative
consequence of combination analysis. Similarly, regardless of whether one
takes a strongly libertarian stance toward the protection of economic freedom,
bodily autonomy, neither, or both, one will likely regard the increased complexity
of judicial doctrine as a negative rather than positive consequence of combining
the clauses. To be sure, some of the values discussed thus far may not carry
an entirely results-neutral flavor: at the margins, for instance, the relative
desirability of decisional foreshadowing, textual fidelity, and judicial restraint,
may depend in part on one’s prior commitments to a particular set of substantive
constitutional outcomes.189 But none of the values discussed thus far are explicitly
results-based in their orientation.

189 To take one example, if an individual identifies as a strict textualist because one believes that
textualism best prevents the Court from transgressing constitutional separation-of-powers principles, then
one’s fidelity-based objections to combination analysis cannot be characterized as entirely results neutral.
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In this Section, by contrast, I examine the propensity of combination
analysis to further or frustrate various substantive agendas that a constitutional
decisionmaker may wish to pursue. The question, in short, is whether
combination analysis ought to be more or less attractive to individuals based on
their big picture views as to what sorts of structures, rights, and institutional
relationships they understand the Constitution to create. Before deciding
whether to embrace combination analysis, a judge may wish to know whether
one or another set of substantive consequences is likely to follow from its
adoption. If the judge favors these consequences, then she will have an
additional reason to combine the clauses. If she disfavors the consequences,
then she will have an additional reason not to do so. And if she views the
consequences as neutral, then she will have identified no substantively
informed preference one way or the other.
So, what substantive consequences are likely to follow from adding
combination analysis to one’s methodological toolkit? This question, as we will
soon see, becomes difficult to answer if combination analysis is viewed as a single,
undifferentiated whole. It is more easily addressed by separating out the three
types of combination arguments that were introduced in Part I: right/right
arguments, right/no-power arguments, and power/power arguments. Each type
of argument, it turns out, conduces to a different set of substantive priorities.
First, right/right combination analysis will carry the predictable effect of
strengthening negative constitutional limits on government action, thus promoting
a libertarian vision of U.S. constitutional law. Right/right combinations enable
courts to invalidate government actions that would pass muster under a purely
clause-specific approach—thereby amplifying the protective effects of the
Constitution’s rights-based constraints. Two rights combined, simply put,
yield more in the way of individual liberty than does each right on its own.
Thus, for judges and scholars who believe that the paramount goal of
constitutional law should be helping individuals to “secure the blessings of
liberty,”190 right/right combination analysis should be warmly embraced. All
190 U.S. CONST. pmbl; see also, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE
CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT
(2014). To this point, however, we should add one caveat: Insofar as the Constitution’s rights-based
obligations impose positive duties on government actors, see, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (requiring states to provide appointed counsel to indigent criminal defendants), right/right
combination arguments would not necessarily yield obviously libertarian results. But given the generally
negative thrust of most of the Constitution’s rights-based guarantees, I believe it’s fair to say that
right/right combinations will tend to enhance rather than detract from pro-libertarian features of the
U.S. constitutional order. See, e.g., EMLIY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG
PLACES: WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 5 (2013) (noting that
litigation movements seeking to establish a federal “constitutional mandate for a more robust welfare
state . . . have met with extremely limited success, and the Supreme Court has generally declined to
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else equal, a doctrinal regime that combines rights-based arguments with
other rights-based arguments should be friendly to the libertarian cause.
A similar point holds for right/no-power combination arguments, which, like
their right/right counterparts, also tend to strengthen the document’s negative,
clause-based restrictions on government action. But there is an important
difference: whereas right/right combinations heighten the Constitution’s
restrictions on both federal and state action, right/no-power arguments will
tend to do so only with respect to federal action, offering no special aid to
rights-based attacks on state-level action.191 In that sense, right/no-power
combinations might hold a special appeal for individuals seeking to limit
federal power while at the same time leaving state power unchecked.192 Thus,
whereas right/right arguments will often prove friendly to the libertarian cause,
right/no-power arguments will often prove friendly to the federalist cause.
Of course, federalism and libertarianism need not reflect a mutually exclusive
set of commitments. Indeed, their relationship may be more mutually reinforcing
than anything else.193 If so, then both right/right and right/no-power combination
arguments might win over both committed libertarians and federalists alike. But
the calculus grows considerably more complex once power/power combination
arguments enter the picture. Power/power combinations, after all, differ from
both right/right and right/no-power combinations in a crucial respect: they
expand rather than constrict the zone of authorized government conduct, thus
yielding a set of national powers that sweep more rather than less broadly than
would otherwise be the case. Power/power combination arguments are thus
explicitly anti-federalist—and arguably anti-libertarian—in their outlook,

read either the Equal Protection or Due Process clause as a mandate for active government
intervention”).
191 For ease of exposition, I am focusing here on right/no-power arguments that combine
conclusions about the absence of an enumerated federal power with conclusions about the applicability
of an individual right. That being said, and as illustrated by Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976),
right/no-power analysis might also operate to treat the federal government more favorably than the
states, at least insofar as the “no-power” limits being combined derive from preemption-based
restrictions on state-level action. Although the former category of cases would likely outnumber the
latter, the mere existence of right/no-power cases at the state and local level requires us to qualify
the claim that right/no-power analysis will always redound to the benefit of dyed-in-the-wool federalists.
192 Consider the example of Chief Justice Rehnquist, who, as Michael Dorf has recently argued,
“was strongly committed to federalism but, in rights cases, more of a statist than a libertarian.”
Michael C. Dorf, What Really Happened in the Affordable Care Act Case, 92 TEX. L. REV. 133, 136
(2013) (reviewing ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE TOUGH LUCK CONSTITUTION AND THE ASSAULT
ON HEALTH CARE REFORM (2013)).
193 See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (“By denying any one government
complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism protects the liberty of the
individual from arbitrary power.”).
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supporting values of nationalism and effective governance at the expense of
values of federalism and limited government.194
In sum, different forms of combination analysis accord with different—and
sometimes starkly conflicting—visions of constitutional law.195 Right/right
combination analysis fits most comfortably with a rights-centered, libertarian
vision, which prioritizes the development of strong negative checks on government
power. Right/no-power combination analysis fits most comfortably with a
federalist-centered vision of the Constitution, which prioritizes the development
of strong negative checks on federal, but not state, power. Finally, power/power
combination analysis fits most comfortably with a nationalist vision, which
prioritizes the development of robust national powers. Each type of combination
analysis tends to promote a set of results that at least one other type will
discourage, and vice versa.
Thus, it is unclear as a descriptive matter what overall substantive consequences
are likely to follow from a wholesale embrace of combination analysis across
all three of these categories. If combinability is a package deal, applicable to
either all types or no types of constitutional clauses, then a judge’s decision
whether to embrace combination analysis will depend on a complex calculation
of substantive tradeoffs. The nationalist judge, for instance, will need to
determine whether the pro-nationalist effects of power/power combination
analysis are likely to outweigh the pro-federalist effects of right/no-power
combination analysis, just as the federalist judge will need to confront the same
question from the opposite end of the spectrum. But if combinability is not a
package deal—if a judge may legitimately embrace, for example, power/power
combination analysis while simultaneously rejecting right/right combination
analysis—then the substantive dimensions of the choice become more clear.
The critical question thus becomes whether it would in fact be proper for
a judge to choose one form of combination analysis but not another. I can
think of no abstract, conceptual basis for drawing such a distinction. I do not
see, for example, anything metaphysically distinctive about rights as opposed
to powers that would render rights combinable but not powers, or vice versa.
Nor do I see an especially strong textual basis for accepting one type of
combination analysis but not another.196 Even in the absence of such
194 It is probably not a coincidence that power/power combination arguments have appeared
most prominently in McCulloch v. Maryland and the Legal Tender Cases, two cases that have been
frequently associated with nationalist, effective-governance values. See supra Section II.C.
195 To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that all substantive visions of constitutional law can be
neatly categorized as “libertarian,” “federalist,” or “nationalist.” The reality is more complicated, with
most individuals adhering to substantive understandings that—appropriately enough—combine different
strands of libertarian, federalist, and nationalist thought, among others. The model here is artificially
simplified, but it still helps to elucidate some analytical connections with real-world relevance.
196 But see Reynolds, supra note 163, at 1345 (suggesting that the Ninth Amendment might
make rights-related claims especially amenable to combination-based reasoning).
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arguments, however, a judge might still justify her partial acceptance of
combination analysis by invoking substance-based reasoning of the sort that
this Section has employed. What if, for instance, a libertarian judge reasoned
that only right/right combinations should be permitted in light of the special
need to safeguard individual liberty against government intrusion? What if a
federalist judge reasoned that only right/no-power combinations should be
permitted in light of the special need to protect state sovereignty against the
threat of an expansive federal government? Would such a judge be committing
the cardinal sin of results-oriented judging, or would she be offering a sound
justification for a particular methodological choice?
Different readers, I suspect, will reach different answers to these questions.
Their answers will depend largely on their receptiveness to the more general
practice of letting substantive considerations affect choices about decisionmaking
methodology. Should decisions about how to apply the Constitution precede,
succeed, or proceed alongside decisions about what the Constitution should
be read to achieve? We might well condemn the judge who reasons backwards
from a desired result in an individual case, but what of the judge who derives
a methodological conclusion from big picture substantive postulates about the
overall aims, purposes, and objectives of U.S. constitutional law? That is the
central question that this inquiry leaves us with, and it is a question warranting
far more attention than I am able to offer here. It is certainly true that different
types of combination arguments support different substantive agendas, but the
question remains whether this truth should matter when it comes to evaluating
the desirability of combination-based decisionmaking.
D. Summing Things Up
Combination analysis presents tradeoffs. On the one hand, combining the
clauses allows courts to avoid anomalous outcomes, to enhance jurisprudential
transparency, to narrow judicial holdings, and to foreshadow clause-specific
decisions. On the other hand, combining the clauses can result in departures
from the constitutional text, the aggrandizement of judicial power, and the
exacerbation of doctrinal complexity. Combination arguments, in short, can
do both good and bad, with the ultimate normative payoff largely dependent
on the context and circumstances in which such arguments are put to use. That
in turn suggests to me that combination analysis should be neither categorically
required nor categorically prohibited in all multiple clause cases. Rather, its
overall utility is better evaluated on an individualized, case-by-case basis.
What is less clear is whether combination analysis should be permitted or
prohibited based on the types of clause-based arguments being combined. That
question, I have tried to suggest, implicates a deeper point of jurisprudential
debate—namely, the question of whether courts may permissibly invoke
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substantive, results-oriented reasoning in defense of large-scale methodological
choices about how to interpret and apply the law. If the answer to that question
is yes, then courts might legitimately choose to combine some types of arguments
(i.e., rights based, no-power based, or power based) but not others. If no, then
decisions about combinability should proceed in a manner that draws no categorical
distinction among right/right, right/no-power, and power/power varieties.
V. COMBINATION ERRORS
Let us now turn to the final line of inquiry, which concerns the means by
which a court might misapply combination analysis and combination-based
precedents. Here, I introduce four potential “combination errors,” each of
which highlights a different way in which combination-based reasoning can
go awry. Although relatively easy to describe in the abstract, these errors raise
difficult questions of their own, bearing not just on the nature of combination
analysis itself, but also on constitutional adjudication more generally. The
purpose of the discussion is thus twofold: first, to offer some prescriptive
suggestions regarding the use of combination arguments in future cases, and
second, to highlight some unresolved issues meriting further scholarly research.
A. Non-Counting Errors
The simplest and most straightforward type of combination error occurs
when a court fails to notice the combination-based origins of a precedent on
which it relies. Call this the error of “non-counting.” A court erroneously
non-counts the combination-based aspects of a prior holding when it applies
that holding to a subsequent case that fails to implicate the same combination
of clauses. The consequence of that decision is an artificial expansion of the prior
holding’s scope, one that attributes to the prior holding a greater degree of
precedential significance than its issuing court likely intended.
Non-counting of this sort arguably occurred in United States v. Salisbury.197
Salisbury involved a void-for-vagueness challenge to a federal prohibition on
“voting more than once.”198 The Sixth Circuit vindicated the challenge,
relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Smith v. Goguen.199
But Goguen, as the Sixth Circuit failed to note, was a combination-based decision,
stemming from a challenge to a flag burning statute that involved both
void-for-vagueness and First Amendment claims.200 The Court’s decision in
Goguen, moreover, explicitly relied on the clauses’ combined effect, explaining that
197
198
199
200

983 F.2d 1369 (6th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 1373-74 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(e)).
Id. at 1378-79. The majority opinion includes ten separate citations to Goguen. See id.
415 U.S. 566 (1974).
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where a law “is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment,
the [void-for-vagueness] doctrine demands a greater degree of specificity than in
other contexts.”201 The court in Salisbury, by contrast, did not confront a First
Amendment claim; it considered only whether the allegedly vague double-voting
prohibition ran afoul of the Due Process Clause.202 Thus, a Supreme Court
precedent that derived from due process and First Amendment concerns took on
binding precedential force in a decision that implicated due process but not First
Amendment concerns. In this way, then, the Sixth Circuit in Salisbury failed
to “count” the free speech aspects of the Supreme Court’s previous decision
in Goguen, demanding of the government the “greater degree of specificity”
that the Court had purported to require in a narrower category of cases.203
To be clear, my claim here is not that the Sixth Circuit reached the wrong
result in Salisbury. Perhaps, for instance, the court would still have found a
fatal vagueness problem in the law even without relying on Goguen; maybe it
could have shown that the defendant’s prosecution in Salisbury implicated
First Amendment interests analogous to what the Court confronted in Goguen;
or maybe it could have provided some other justification for adhering to Goguen’s
instructions even in the absence of a First Amendment claim. But Salisbury is
at least illustrative of the problems that can arise from an unthinking reliance
on combination-based precedents to decide ostensibly clause-specific cases.
At a minimum, courts should take care to acknowledge the combination-based
nature of the holdings they invoke and to explain why those holdings should
continue to carry force in the absence of an analogous multiple clause situation.
B. Double Counting
A second type of combination error can be seen as the flipside of the first.
Just as courts might undervalue the combination-based elements of a prior decision,
so too might they overvalue these elements, by combining constitutional clauses
that have already been combined. Call this the error of “double counting.”204
Suppose, for instance, that a court has enjoined the popular magazine Military
Secrets Monthly from publishing and distributing its upcoming issue. Lawyers
for the magazine challenge the order as a free speech violation, citing several
Id. at 573.
983 F.2d at 1378-79. That is not to say that the voting prosecution in Salisbury did not in fact
implicate First Amendment concerns. Perhaps the Court could have reasoned that by prohibiting the
act of voting more than once, the United States was at least touching on some (marginally protected)
form of political expression. But the Sixth Circuit’s opinion itself provides no indication that the
court was entertaining or acting upon any arguments to that effect. See id.
203 For a related discussion as to why distortions of this sort can be bad for the doctrine writ
large, see Michael Coenen, Spillover Across Remedies, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1211 (2014).
204 See Faigman, Madisonian Balancing, supra note 8, at 662 (noting that “double counting must
be avoided when aggregating rights”).
201
202
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cases for the proposition that “prior restraints on speech and publication are the
most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.”205
But the magazine’s lawyers then make an interesting move: they argue that the
prior restraint rule should apply with special force in this case, because the
magazine should also receive the benefit of the First Amendment’s Press Clause.
Military Secrets Monthly is claiming, in other words, that the Speech Clause and
the Press Clause of the First Amendment should together impose on the
government a nearly insuperable justificatory hurdle to sustain its injunction—a
hurdle even higher than what the prior restraint rule would normally require.
The magazine’s argument should be rejected. But why? The answer has to do
with double counting. A moment’s perusal of the relevant case law reveals that
the protections of the Press Clause have already been baked into the Court’s
strong presumption against prior restraints. Indeed, in Near v. Minnesota, the
Court drew an explicit connection between the guarantees of the Press Clause
and the dictates of the prior restraint rule, associating the rule with “the historic
conception of the liberty of the press” and characterizing it as necessary to protect
“the essential attributes of that liberty.”206 Subsequent prior-restraint cases,
moreover, have made clear the continuing relevance of the Court’s Press Clause
concerns.207 Thus, while the Court has sometimes prohibited prior restraints
on speakers lacking journalistic affiliations,208 it nevertheless remains true, as
Professor Sonja West has put it, that “the language and logic of the [Court’s
prior restraint] cases are clearly press-focused.”209 Military Secrets Monthly is
thus trying to pull a fast one on us, pointing to the Press Clause as a reason
to bolster a set of protections that the Press Clause has already bolstered.
The Press Clause argument of Military Secrets Monthly presents an obvious
instance of invalid double counting. Other instances, however, may be more
difficult to identify. Does the fundamental-rights prong of equal protection

Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
283 U.S. 697, 709 (1931).
Various Justices in the landmark Pentagon Papers Case, for instance, referenced the “essential
role” played by the press “in our democracy,” N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971)
(Black, J., concurring), explained that “without an informed and free press there cannot be an
enlightened people,” id. at 728 (Stewart, J., concurring), and expressly invoked the “extraordinary
protection against prior restraints enjoyed by the press under our constitutional system,” id. at 730-31
(White J., concurring). And the Court would later note in Nebraska Press Ass’n that the “liberty of the
press, and of speech . . . afford special protection against orders that prohibit the publication or
broadcast of particular information or commentary.” 427 U.S. at 556.
208 See, e.g., Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (invalidating as an
unlawful “prior restraint on speech” a municipal ordinance requiring individuals to obtain a permit
before holding a protest or parade on public property); see also Morse v. Republican Party of Va., 517
U.S. 186, 244 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Our cases have heavily disfavored all manner of prior
restraint upon the exercise of freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment.”).
209 Sonja R. West, The Stealth Press Clause, 48 GA. L. REV. 729, 742 (2014).
205
206
207
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jurisprudence already reflect the influence of substantive due process doctrine,210
or might litigants sometimes strengthen a fundamental-rights-based equal
protection claim by invoking the Due Process Clause as a further basis for
relief?211 Does the content-discrimination principle of free speech doctrine
already incorporate the teachings of the Equal Protection Clause, or might some
acts of speech-related discrimination be subject to an especially rigorous set of
rules stemming from the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause
together (such as when, for instance, a particular set of content-based rules
impose a special burden on a “discrete and insular minority”)?212 These and other
areas of doctrine may or may not already incorporate the teachings of another
constitutional clause. Consequently, determining whether or not they do so
will affect subsequent determinations as to whether future combinations of
these clauses reflect erroneous forms of double counting.
The identification of double counting errors also implicates difficult value
judgments. Consider in this respect the Court’s recent Copyright Clause
decisions in Eldred v. Ashcroft213 and Golan v. Holder.214 In both cases Justice
Breyer argued for invalidating a federal expansion of copyright protections as
inconsistent with a right/no-power combination of the First Amendment and
the Copyright Clause.215 But Justice Ginsburg (writing for the majority in

210 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak
Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004) (noting that in this context, “due process and equal
protection . . . are profoundly interlocked in a legal double helix”).
211 The Court itself has sometimes suggested that its fundamental-rights equal protection cases
already reflect the combined operation of the Equal Protection Clause and other constitutional
guarantees. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973) (noting
that the key to discovering whether a right is fundamental for equal protection purposes “lies in
assessing whether [it is] explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution”). If this is correct,
then any attempt to combine a substantive due process claim with a fundamental-rights-based equal
protection claim would give rise to double counting problems.
212 United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). On the relationship between the
content-discrimination principle and the Equal Protection Clause, see Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination
Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 286-96 (2012) (suggesting that “the two doctrines have informed each
other in certain ways”). See also Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (noting that “the equal
protection claim in this case is closely intertwined with First Amendment interests”).
Similarly, one might wonder about the variety of procedural safeguards built into First Amendment
doctrine—for example, the prior restraint rule, the overbreadth rule, the requirement of a clear and
convincing evidence standard in certain defamation proceedings and so forth. Cf. Henry P. Monaghan,
First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 518 (1970) (noting that, in shaping these
safeguards, the Court “has placed little reliance upon the due process requirements of the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, but instead has turned directly to the first amendment as the source of the rules”).
Questions remain as to whether these requirements already reflect the influence of the Due Process Clause,
and whether a court might permissibly combine them with other elements of due process doctrine to
produce an even more stringent set of procedural limitations on speech-infringing government action.
213 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
214 132 S. Ct. 873 (2012).
215 See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.
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both cases) offered a different take on the First Amendment’s role. The
Copyright Clause, she explained, was intended from the beginning to serve
as an “engine of free expression,” giving Congress the lawmaking tools it needed
to “suppl[y] the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”216 What is
more, she continued, copyright law already contained “built-in First Amendment
accommodations”—namely, the idea–expression distinction and the fair use
defense—both of which safeguarded the speech-related interests associated with
federal copyright restrictions.217 Therefore, “[g]iven the ‘speech-protective
purposes and safeguards’ embraced by copyright law,” there was no need to
apply heightened review to the laws at issue in Eldred or Golan.218 Or to put
it differently, any attempt to cite the First Amendment for purposes of limiting
existing Copyright Clause protections would artificially inflate the First
Amendment’s decisional effect: copyright law, Justice Ginsburg reasoned,
already enjoyed the benefit of First Amendment safeguards. On her view, adding
more safeguards to the existing ones would have amounted to a double counting
of the First Amendment’s influence.
That Justices Breyer and Ginsburg reached different conclusions regarding
the permissibility of reading the Copyright Clause in light of the First Amendment
suggests that descriptive debates over the presence of double counting errors
will sometimes mask what are at their core normative debates about what the
substance of the doctrine should be. Ultimately, the Breyer–Ginsburg debate
boiled down to competing value judgments on the question of how much influence
the First Amendment should carry in copyright cases: for Justice Ginsburg, the
First Amendment had done enough work in creating free speech safeguards
for copyright law, whereas for Justice Breyer, more such work was needed. Not all
double counting errors, then, will be as easy to detect as in the example of Military
Secrets Monthly. In difficult cases, whether a combination argument double
counts the prescriptive command of a constituent clause will depend—at least in
part—on how much influence one thinks that command should bring to bear.
C. Ignoring Negative Implications
A further type of combination error stems from a court’s failure to honor
the negative implications created by one of the clauses it combines. As far back
as Marbury v. Madison, the Court has recognized that “[a]ffirmative words are
often, in their operation, negative of other objects than those affirmed.”219
216 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 558 (1985)); see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (“[C]opyright’s purpose is to promote the creation
and publication of free expression.”).
217 Golan, 132 S. Ct. at 890 (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219-20).
218 Id. (quoting Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219).
219 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
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When applicable, this principle poses complications for the combination of
clauses, especially with respect to power-related provisions, several of which
have been said to carry with them “external limits” on the scope of all other
powers enumerated in the constitutional text.220 The Copyright Clause, for
example, authorizes Congress to “secur[e] for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”221
This language, many commentators have argued, would render invalid not
just the exercise of the copyright power to create a permanent copyright
regime, but also the exercise of any other enumerated power (such as, for
instance, the power to regulate interstate commerce) to do the same.222
Analogous claims might be made of the Bankruptcy Clause’s requirement that
laws of bankruptcy be uniform223 and the Militia Clause’s stipulation that
Congress “provide for calling forth the militia to execute Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections, and repel Invasions.”224 These and other provisions
describe enumerated powers in a way that might imply the existence of a
negative, Constitution-wide check on how other powers may be exercised.225
When we associate negative implications with positive enumerations, we
throw a wrench into the mechanics of combination analysis. Just as it might
be problematic to ground a perpetual grant of copyright protection in the
Commerce Clause alone, so too might it be problematic to ground such a
grant in the Commerce and Copyright Clauses acting together. If the Copyright
Clause does in fact create an “external limit” on the exercise of other powers,
it no longer makes sense to say that the hypothetical law qualifies as even
partially valid under the Copyright Clause. Rather, the argument goes, the
Copyright Clause would totally prohibit the law, thus defeating any and all
attempts to identify some other source of constitutional power to enact the
220 See Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause’s External Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J.
1329, 1338-45 (2012).
221 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added).
222 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, A Wiseguy’s Approach to Information Products: Muscling
Copyright and Patent into a Unitary Theory of Intellectual Property, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 195, 230; Fromer,
supra note 220; Lawrence B. Solum, Congress’s Power to Promote the Progress of Science: Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2002). But see Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and
Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 272, 277 (2004) (“The somewhat counterintuitive but
inescapable conclusion is that, if it can find another power to support the legislation, Congress may
grant exclusive rights without regard to the limits set out in the Intellectual Property Clause.”).
223 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; see also Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468-69
(1982) (“[I]f we were to hold that Congress had the power to enact nonuniform bankruptcy laws
pursuant to the Commerce Clause, we would eradicate from the Constitution a limitation on the
power of Congress to enact bankruptcy laws.”).
224 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; see also Solum, supra note 222, at 19 (noting that the Militia
Clause “grants the power to use a means and qualifies that power by specifying the ends for which
it may be exercised”).
225 See also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1 (granting the power to impose “Duties, Imposts, and
Excises” while requiring that such exactions be “uniform throughout the United States”).
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law. Combining the Copyright Clause with the Commerce Clause to sustain
a permanent grant of copyright protection would thus constitute a combination
error—one that ignores the negative restrictions on indefinite-copyright creation
that the Copyright Clause impliedly creates.
Debates over the role of negative implications surfaced in the Legal Tender
Cases.226 In Knox v. Lee, recall, the Court upheld the Legal Tender Act by
reference to the combined operation of several constitutional provisions.227
To Justice Field in dissent, however, this argument overlooked the distinctively
limiting aspects of one enumerated power in particular—namely, the Coinage
Clause. This clause, Field argued, not only failed to authorize, but in fact,
affirmatively prohibited, the issuance of paper money by the federal government:
as Field put it, the Coinage Clause signified that “the only standard of value
authorized by the Constitution was to consist of metallic coins struck or
regulated by the direction of Congress, and that the power to establish any
other standard was denied by that instrument.”228 Several of his colleagues, of
course, disagreed: to them, the Coinage Clause simply provided a modicum
of support—though by no means sufficient support—for the derivation of a
general federal power to issue a national currency consisting of both coins
and pieces of paper.229 Their debate thus boiled down to the question of
whether the Coinage Clause imposed a negative limit on the issuance of paper
money, or whether it simply required the government to seek additional
support for that power from other enumerated sources.
As the foregoing discussion should reveal, work still needs to be done in
sorting out precisely whether and, if so, when we should read a positive grant
of power to impose negative, Constitution-wide limits on the exercise of all
other powers granted. I have not purported to answer those questions here;
rather, I have simply suggested that if enumerated powers can give rise to
Constitution-wide limits on government action—as has been supposed by
many commentators (and, at times, the Court itself)—then any attempt at
power/power combination analysis must take care not to ignore the powers’
negative implications.

See supra notes 74–85 and accompanying text.
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).
Id. at 660 (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
See id. at 547 (“We do not, however, rest our assertion of the power of Congress to enact
legal tender laws upon this grant. We assert only that the grant can, in no just sense, be regarded as
containing an implied prohibition against their enactment, and that, if it raises any implications,
they are of complete power over the currency, rather than restraining.”).
226
227
228
229
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D. Disregarding Transactional Unity
The final type of combination error is also the most mysterious, implicating
deep and difficult issues related to the framing of transactions in constitutional
law.230 The underlying idea is that separate and distinct constitutional events
merit separate and distinct constitutional conclusions. If that proposition is
correct, then there exists a further limit on the proper scope of combination
analysis—a limit that would prohibit the combination of multiple clause-specific
claims that each concern a transactionally separate event.
To see the point, imagine a variation on the facts of Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser.231 Suppose in particular that the claimant has asserted that
an entendre-laden speech he delivered at school deserved First Amendment
protection. Suppose further, however, that the claimant has raised an altogether
different due process claim, which stems from a later punishment the school
imposed on him for taking part in a nondisruptive senior prank. Our hypothetical
claimant’s contention, in other words, is that the school district violated his
First Amendment rights when it punished him for delivering the allegedly
offensive speech and then subsequently violated his due process rights when
it punished him for participating in the senior prank.
Whatever the merits of these two claims, any attempt at combination analysis
in the modified version of Fraser would strike most readers as problematic.232 But
why should that be so? The answer has to do with what we might call the variable
of transactional unity. In the actual case of Fraser, both the due process and First
Amendment claims stemmed from a single constitutional transaction—namely,
the speech that Fraser delivered. In our modified version, by contrast, the two
claims relate to two separate and seemingly discrete transactions, with the First
Amendment claim stemming from the claimant’s speech and the due process
claim stemming from the subsequent senior prank. The two claims in the
actual version of Fraser itself thus shared a transactional unity that the two
claims in the modified version do not.
Strong intuitions support the proposition that transactionally separate
events deserve separate constitutional conclusions. But it is difficult to articulate
why this should be so. What is the problem with concluding that the school
district violated the Constitution by imposing on our hypothetical claimant
two punishments, each of which was constitutionally problematic in its own

230 See Daryl J. Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1313
(2002) (noting that “in constitutional law we quickly lose our intuitive grasp on what counts as a
transaction for purposes of identifying harm”).
231 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
232 Id. at 692 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that “[t]he interest in free speech protected
by the First Amendment and the interest in fair procedure protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment combine to require th[e] conclusion” that Fraser’s punishment was invalid).
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way? Perhaps the answer has to do with the value of finality—the worry is that
once we allow for the possibility of deriving a single constitutional violation from
the partial violations reflected in various events, all past government actions, even
if previously adjudged to be constitutionally permissible, might later become
the basis of a combination-based finding of constitutional invalidity. Or perhaps
the concern is rooted in considerations of complexity and arbitrariness—if we
discarded the requirement of transactional unity, how would we know (and
who would get to decide) what particular set of events would be eligible for
combination in a given case?233 Or perhaps there is some other set of persuasive
considerations lurking beneath our intuitive discomfort with multiple-event
combinations. I am not sure. All I can say for now is that the intuition is there.
Further difficult questions attend the task of actually distinguishing between
transactionally separate and transactionally unified constitutional claims.234
Transactional separateness may be easy to identify in the modified version of
Fraser, just as transactional unity may be easy to identify in many of the
examples considered in Part II.235 But a hazy middle ground occupies the area
in between the easy cases.236 If, for instance, government agents conduct an
allegedly unlawful search of my house, leading to my conviction under an
allegedly unconstitutional criminal statute, do the search and conviction each
individually count as separate transactions, or can they both be viewed as
elements of an ongoing single transaction involving the prosecution of my case?
If a trial judge denies three different evidentiary motions over the course of
my trial, is the relevant transactional unit the trial itself or each unsuccessful
motion? If I identify potential constitutional defects in two separate provisions
of the same congressional statute, is the relevant transactional unit the enactment
233 But see Levinson, supra note 230, at 1320 (noting that in some cases, a “broader transactional
frame could at least have the advantage of economizing on administrative costs”).
234 Similar difficulties can arise in cases involving the same constitutional provision. As
Professors Abrams and Garrett note, for instance, the Supreme Court has recognized that discrete and
separate “conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation ‘in combination’
when each would not do so alone.” See Abrams & Garrett, supra note 8, at 12 (quoting Wilson v.
Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)). But as Abrams and Garrett point out, the potency of this rule
depends largely on how one characterizes the transactional frame. See id. (“The relevant transaction
for a given constitutional violation can be defined broadly, to constitute a single ‘claim,’ or narrowly,
requiring separate litigation of different acts.”). For example, does the rule permit the combination
of defective conditions in one building with defective conditions in another building to support the
conclusion that the prison itself is in violation of the Eighth Amendment? Would it permit combination
of defective conditions at separate prisons to demonstrate an Eighth Amendment violation by an
entire prison system? Could past defective conditions be combined with present defective conditions
to reach similar conclusions? And so forth.
235 For example, a strong argument can be made that any facial challenge to a statute or regulation,
regardless of how many different claims it involves, concerns the single transactional event of the law’s
enactment by a legislature. Cf. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L.
REV. 1209, 1238 (2010) (“[A] ‘facial challenge,’ in particular, is a challenge to the action of a legislature.”).
236 Levinson, supra note 230, at 1314.
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of the statute as a whole, or the enactment of each of the statute’s provisions?
Or what about Fraser itself: Might the school’s decision of whether to punish
Fraser for delivering his speech actually qualify as a separate transaction from
the school’s decision of how to punish him?
These may all seem like silly questions, but to the extent that the fusion
of multiple constitutional transactions does indeed qualify as a combination
error, we have no choice but to try to answer them as best we can. For some,
that point may strike the decisive blow against transactional unity as a limit
on combination analysis. If we simply allow courts to employ combination
arguments across any and all constitutional events, then we do not have to
figure out when we are dealing with one event and when we are dealing with
several events. But for others, the intuition will persist: transactionally separate
events require transactionally separate judgments, and that will remain the
case even if it requires us to work through some tricky conceptual puzzles.
CONCLUSION
So should we rewrite the constitutional law casebooks, scrapping their
clause-based organizational approaches and relying instead on something entirely
different? No. The clauses, after all, do play a major role in delineating internal
boundaries of constitutional doctrine, and those boundaries lend helpful
measures of simplicity and clarity to the field of constitutional law.237 The
organizational virtues of clause specificity are all to the good, and they would
not long remain in place if we insisted on deciding each and every case by
reference to all of the clauses understood together.
But the simplifying benefits of a clause-based approach do not provide a
reason for dismissing combination analysis out of hand. Doctrinally speaking,
it is there. Conceptually speaking, it makes sense. And normatively speaking,
it has much to be said on its behalf. Some constitutional cases really do
implicate the protections of multiple clauses at the same time. The resolution
of those cases, moreover, often benefits from a decisional approach that accords
significance to that fact. And when that is so, courts should indeed consider
the clauses’ combined effects.
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See Porat & Posner, supra note 8, at 56.

